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I study housing and market-based financial intermediaries (MBIs) as sources of business
cycles versus propagation mechanisms of traditional macroeconomic shocks using macro
and financial data from 1985-2011. Combined, shocks originating in the MBI funding
market and to housing demand account for 4% − 42% of fluctuations in macro, financial,
and house price data. Shocks originating from MBIs account for the initial phase of the
housing boom from 2001-2004 and dynamics in credit, leverage, and investment since the
late 1990s. Housing demand shocks account for the 2006 collapse in housing prices but
are otherwise unimportant. A decomposition of the Great Recession supports a growing
consensus that it was an unprecedented confluence of large shocks, only some of which
were directly related to the housing market and financial sector. A steady-state analy-
sis of the effects of financial deregulation reveals that higher MBI leverage cushions the
economy from traditional macro shocks but at the cost of making it more vulnerable to
financial sector shocks.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Together with its severity and duration, the Great Recession is unique among postwar
recessions in its seeming precipitating sources: a nationwide collapse in house prices
and financial crisis the likes of which had not been seen since the Great Depression. The
steep rise in house prices and greater presence of highly leveraged market-based financial
intermediaries (MBIs) prior to the recession makes these precipitating sources seem all
the more convincing.1 But nearly three years after the end of the recession, “assigning
blame” to the housing market and financial sector has proven to be complicated. After
reviewing 21 books on the Great Recession written by academics, economic journalists,
and policymakers, Lo (2012) finds almost a 50-50 split. Half lay the blame to the housing
market, with the seeds of the crisis sown beginning with the bursting of the house price
bubble in 2006. The other half attributes the liquidity crisis faced by MBIs in late 2007 and
2008 as the shock which did the most damage. Hamilton (2009) looks beyond housing
and MBIs, presenting evidence that the oil price price spike of 2007-2008 was the initial
shock that caused a decline in consumption and led to the bursting of the housing bubble
and subsequent financial collapse.
The above competing theories of the causes of the Great Recession are attempts to
answer a broader question: to what extent are housing and MBIs sources of business cycles
versus propagation mechanisms of other shocks? In this paper I assess the importance of
both roles in the U.S. using data from 1985-2011.
First, I disentangle the business cycle importance of (a) shocks originating in an MBI-
dominated financial sector with endogenous leverage, versus (b) shocks originating in
a housing market with collateralized household mortgage debt. The shocks need to be
1Examples of MBIs include security broker-dealers, finance companies, and asset-backed security is-
suers. I review the key features of MBIs relevant for this analysis in Section 2.
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disentangled because households typically need to access the credit market to purchase
a home, making housing and credit complementary goods. Given this relationship, it is
not obvious what is the source of the cycle - is it an increase in the demand for housing,
increase in the supply of credit, or a shock originating elsewhere?2
Second, in light of financial deregulation which affected both MBIs and mortgage
lending over the past 30 years, I assess how long run structural changes which allow
for higher household and MBI leverage affect the extent to which these sectors propagate
other economic shocks.
The framework of the analysis is a standard New Keynesian model with disturbances
to preferences, technology, monetary policy, and production-sector credit disturbances, as
in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Jermann and Quadrini (2011). The model is augmented
with housing, heterogenous households, entrepreneurs that operate the production sec-
tor, and collateral constraints on debt, as in Iacoviello (2005).3 The housing market be-
comes a source of fluctuations through shocks to housing preferences (housing demand
shocks). I further augment the model with a financial sector of MBIs that lends to house-
holds and entrepreneurs. To capture the main characteristic of MBIs - market-based fund-
ing constraints - the supply of credit is determined through endogenous leverage con-
straints on MBIs, as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). MBIs become a source of fluctuations
through a shock originating in the funding market for MBIs (financial funding shocks).
The model is estimated using Bayesian methods. In addition to using standard macroe-
conomic data, I identify the financial funding, entrepreneur credit, and housing demand
shocks using data on house prices, mortgage and business credit, and leverage of U.S.
security broker-dealers.
2Boom-bust cycles in housing are typically associated with boom-bust cycles in credit and financial
innovation. This is a feature robust across both advanced and emerging economics. For reduced form
evidence, see Claessens et al. (2010); Ahearne et al. (2005); Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004); Cardarelli et al.
(2009); Goodhart and Hofmann (2008); Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
3Iacoviello and Neri (2009) show that an estimated version of this model captures the business cycle
dynamics of macro variables and house prices over the period 1965-2006.
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The importance of financial funding and housing demand shocks as sources of busi-
ness cycles is nontrivial: combined, they account for at least 15% of fluctuations in invest-
ment, the t-bill rate, house prices, credit, and broker-dealer leverage. Traditional macro
shocks together still account for the majority of fluctuations in all macro and financial
variables, explaining anywhere from 56% (house prices) to 93% (consumption) of busi-
ness cycle movements.
In relative terms, financial funding shocks are more important sources of business cy-
cle fluctuations than housing demand shocks and have a pervasive influence over invest-
ment, house prices, credit, and leverage. Housing demand shocks, on the other hand,
mainly drive own-market fluctuations in house prices and mortgage loans with little
propagation to the rest of the economy.
I decompose the Great Recession and find that it was an unprecedented coincidence of
large shocks, only some of which are financial and housing related. In my decomposition,
negative technology shocks beginning in 2006 were the first disturbance. Technology
shocks account for most of the decline in consumption and eventually contributed to
declines in investment and credit. Housing demand shocks followed shortly thereafter,
causing a collapse in house prices and contributing to declines in investment and further
contractions in mortgage credit. Financial funding shocks were stimulative until 2007,
mitigating the effects of negative technology and housing demand shocks on investment,
credit, and leverage. But ultimately, large negative financial funding shocks dealt the final
blow, causing significant further declines in investment and credit.
My explanation of the causes of the Great Recession closely resembles that of Stock
and Watson (2012), who decompose the Great Recession using a structural dynamic factor
model (DFM) and a large set of macroeconomic and financial data. The TFP shocks in my
model show up as oil price shocks in the DFM used by Stock and Watson, corroborating
Hamilton (2009) that the oil price spike of 2007-2008 was the initial negative shock that
3
led to the downturn.
Since the recession has ended, my decomposition reveals that financial funding shocks
account almost entirely for interest rates being at the zero-lower bound. In the recovery,
negative cost-push shocks, positive discount factor shocks, and the zero-lower bound
constraint on monetary policy have kept a lid on stronger gains in investment and con-
sumption. In the Stock and Watson DFM, discount factor shocks show up as shocks to
policy uncertainty.
Independent of their role as a source of fluctuations, housing and MBIs are equally
important as influencing the volatility of business cycles. When steady state capital re-
quirements are lowered, MBIs cushion the economy from macro and housing demand
shocks by lowering volatility across macro variables, house prices, and credit. But, lower
steady state capital requirements makes the economy more vulnerable to financial fund-
ing shocks - the volatility of macro and financial variables is higher in response to financial
funding shocks and financial funding shocks become more important in driving business
cycle fluctuations. Higher long-run loan-to-value (LTV) limits for households results in
an unambiguous increase in macroeconomic and financial instability.
The steady-state analysis reconciles the pre-crisis belief that financial innovation could
have been a contributor to the Great Moderation with the post-crisis skepticism of the
benefits of financial deregulation and resurgence of the “Minksy moment.” In terms
of the Great Recession, the analysis confirms that not only was it a recession associated
with uncharacteristically large financial and housing market shocks, but the economy was
more responsive to them due to underlying trends in leverage brought about by financial
deregulation.
To my knowledge, I am the first to address the relative business cycle importance
of credit supply shocks vs. housing demand shocks in a structural model. Iacoviello
4
and Neri (2009), Liu et al. (2010), and Walentin (2011) all assess the role of housing
demand shocks in business cycle fluctuations, but none of these analyses explicitly in-
clude a financial sector or provides a decomposition of the Great Recession. Jermann and
Quadrini (2011) accounts for the Great Recession with technology shocks and financial
shocks strictly on firms, but ignores the role of housing and the financial sector itself as a
source of fluctuations.
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CHAPTER 2
MARKET-BASED INTERMEDIARIES: SOME FACTS AND FEATURES
In addition to being the focal point in the financial crisis, market-based intermediaries
have played an important role in mortgage finance since the late 1980s. In this chapter
I review key facts about MBIs and their role in the housing market as well as existing
evidence of their role in the business cycle.
2.1 MBIs: Key players in the financial sector
The difference between traditional bank-based intermediation and market-based inter-
mediation is displayed schematically in Figure C.1. Traditional bank-based intermedi-
aries take (insured) deposits from households and lend the funds to other households.
BBIs hold loans on their balance sheets. In contrast, market-based intermediation in-
volves multiple, specialized financial institutions, each of which is funded through usu-
ally short-term, uninsured markets, and consists of buying mortgages from their origi-
nating institution, packaging them into marketable securities, and selling them to institu-
tional investors or other MBIs as investments or collateral for more short-term funding.
Adrian and Shin (2010c) and Gorton (2010) document the increasing role of MBIs in
the financial sector from the late 1980s. Total assets of bank and market-based intermedi-
aries are plotted in Figure C.2. By the mid 2000s, assets of security broker-dealers nearly
equaled that of commercial banks, with assets of security broker-dealers growing at an
annual rate nearly eight-times that of commercial banks, nonfinancial corporations, and
households. Adrian and Shin (2010a) break down the liabilities of security broker-dealers
and find the majority of their funding comes from repo markets. To get a perspective
of the importance of this short-term funding market for broker-dealers, Figure C.3 dis-
plays the value of outstanding repo contracts held by primary dealers, a subset of broker-
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dealers that bid at U.S. Treasury auctions, against the M1 money stock and financial com-
mercial paper outstanding. The value of repos outstanding surpassed the M1 money
stock from the mid 1990s and grew as large as four-times M1 by the eve of the crisis.
As carefully documented by several authors, the epicenter of the financial crisis was the
implosion of short- term funding markets for MBIs.1 Commercial banks and other bank-
based intermediaries suffered relatively little during the crisis, even increasing their assets
in the aggregate well into the Great Recession (Adrian and Shin, 2010a).
2.2 MBIs: Key players in the mortgage market
Figure C.4 documents the increasing importance of MBIs in the growth of housing credit
since the 1980s.2 MBIs held over 60% of all mortgages outstanding at the peak of the hous-
ing boom. Using micro data on mortgage originations, several studies have suggested a
causal link from MBIs to mortgage originations (i.e., a shift in the supply of mortgage
funding instead of a shift in the demand for mortgages by households).3 It is unclear
as of yet the relative importance of specific factors within the financial sector - such as
deregulation and advances in information technology, versus other macro factors such as
historically low interest rates and the influx of global savings from abroad, in generating
the increase in credit supply.4
The collapse of house prices beginning in 2006 is largely blamed for the loss of con-
fidence in mortgage-backed securities that were used as collateral in repo contracts and
1See Brunnermeier (2009); Adrian and Shin (2009, 2010a); Gorton (2008) for detailed accounts of the
crises and subsequent policy responses in the immediate aftermath.
2See Green and Wachter (2005) for a historical review of housing market finance, and Adrian and Shin
(2010c) for a detailed analysis of the role of MBIs in mortgage finance from the 1980s to the crises.
3See Nadauld and Sherlund (2009), Gabriel and Rosenthal (2007), and Mian and Sufi (2008).
4See Rajan (2009) for an argument that the influx of savings from abroad played an important role in
the credit and housing boom and Taylor (2007) for an argument that the Federal Reserve, through setting
interest rates persistently below that suggested by the Taylor rule, contributed to the boom housing credit.
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held on the balance sheets of MBIs (Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton, 2008). However, a shock
originating within the financial system could also be an important factor in the crises. I
find evidence supporting this hypothesis in Owsley (2011). I study the effects of a hous-
ing demand shock on leverage of both bank and market-based intermediaries using a
standard monetary VAR augmented with house prices, leverage, and credit. A negative
house price shock causes MBI leverage to increase persistently for 8-10 quarters, the largest
effect on broker-dealers. This response is inconsistent with the massive deleveraging of
MBIs during the Great Recession and suggests the housing market alone cannot explain
the crisis.
2.3 MBIs and the business cycle
There is also growing evidence that MBIs are important in understanding business cycle
fluctuations beyond the recent financial crisis. Adrian et al. (2010) systematically investi-
gate the forecasting power of all financial intermediaries in the U.S. Flow of Funds using
balance sheet variables such as asset and leverage growth, and find that MBIs - in par-
ticular, broker-dealers - forecast real activity. In contrast, commercial banks posses no
forecasting power.
Part of the reason MBIs seem to provide better information about financial market
and overall macroeconomic conditions is the distinct behavior of their balance sheets. As
documented by Adrian and Shin, broker-dealers engage in active management of their
balance sheets. In contrast, commercial banks exhibit behavior akin to targeting a con-
stant leverage ratio. The implicit market-based funding constraints faced by MBIs, which
determine balance sheet positions, are more reflective of both macroeconomic and finan-
cial market conditions than the regulations which largely determine commercial bank
balance sheets.
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Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011b) provide further evidence that MBIs capture the impor-
tance of finance in the business cycle by decomposing corporate bond yields. Gilchrist
and Zakrajsek decompose corporate bond spreads into two components: (1) that at-
tributable to countercyclical movements in expected defaults and (2) an excess bond pre-
mium (EBP), which represents the capacity and willingness of the financial sector to bear
risk beyond compensation for default. Gilchrist and Zakrajsek find the EBP to have su-
perior GDP forecasting ability relative to the default-component of the corporate bond
spread and find shocks to the premium to significantly affect consumption, investment,
output and inflation.
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek show the EBP closely tracks credit-default swap (CDS) premi-
ums of the U.S. primary dealers. A shock to the profitability of primary dealers leads to
a persistent increase in their credit-default swap (CDS) premiums, which is mirrored by
a nearly identical rise in the EBP. Since changes in CDS premiums reflect changes in the
ability of MBIs to borrow funds that are lent out to the rest of the economy, then the close
relationship between CDS spreads and the EBP suggest MBIs can be a important source
of shocks which ultimately affects real activity.
2.4 Summary
Market-based intermediaries have dwarfed bank-based intermediaries in balance sheet
growth, presence in the mortgage market, and role in the financial crisis. While there
exists evidence that shocks to MBI balance sheets have real affects, there is little evidence
to suggest how important outside shocks are relative to shocks originating with MBIs
themselves. I now present the model which will be used to disentangle the importance of
MBIs from traditional macro and housing shocks in the business cycle.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL MODEL
3.1 The Model Economy
The model is a New Keynesian DSGE framework with three agents: impatient house-
holds, patient households, and entrepreneurs. Final goods consist of nondurable con-
sumption and (durable) housing.
Patient households have a larger discount factor than impatient households and en-
trepreneurs. Patient households provide labor services to entrepreneurs, consume final
goods, and lend to/operate the financial sector. Impatient households borrow from the
financial sector, provide labor services to entrepreneurs, and consume final goods. En-
trepreneurs also borrow from the financial sector, consume, and produce an intermedi-
ate good using household labor, capital, and housing. Impatient households and en-
trepreneurs are constrained in their ability to borrow by a standard collateral constraint.
Monopolistic retailers, owned by patient households and subject to nominal price
rigidities, transform the intermediate good into the final consumption good.
Citing the importance of MBIs in the financial sector and mortgage market discussed
in Chapter 2, I model a financial sector entirely composed of MBIs. The financial sector,
operated by bankers who are members of patient households, channels retained earn-
ings from previous lending and deposits from patient households into loans to impatient
households and entrepreneurs. The borrowing constraint of bankers responds endoge-
nously to changes in their expected future profitability, reflecting the market-based fund-
ing constraints faced by MBIs.
There are real rigidities in the form of adjustment costs and consumption habits. Busi-
10
ness cycle dynamics originate from shocks to preferences (both inter and intratemporal),
technology (both TFP and investment-specific), monetary policy, inflation (i.e., a “cost-
push” shock), and credit tightness for entrepreneurs (similar to Liu et al. (2010) and Jer-
mann and Quadrini (2011)). I call the collection of these disturbances “macro shocks.”
Rigidities and shocks of this form have demonstrated success in capturing business cycle
dynamics of macroeconomic variables - see Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters
(2007), and Jermann and Quadrini (2011). To give a role to the housing market and finan-
cial sector as a source of fluctuations, the model is augmented with a housing demand
shock (Iacoviello, 2005) and a financial sector funding shock (developed below).
3.1.1 Households
Patient and impatient households are each in unit mass. A representative household
within each group maximizes:
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βxGc)t zt
Γx ln (cx,t − xcx,t−1) + jt jx ln (hx,t) − φhx (hx,t) − τt n1+χxx,t1 + χx
 (3.1)
where x = i, p, 0 < βi < βp < 1 and cx,t, hx,t, and nx,t are consumption, housing, and labor
supply for household-type x at date t. Units of consumption are units of a Dixit-Stiglitz
composite of a continuum of final goods with elasticity of substitution ξ > 1.
Households are subject to intertemporal preference shocks, captured by zt, housing
preference shocks, captured by jt, and labor supply shocks, captured by τt. The shocks
evolve according to
ln (zt) = ρz ln (zt−1) + uz,t, ln ( jt) = ρ j ln ( jt−1) + u j,t, ln (τt) = ρτ ln (τt−1) + uτ,t
11
where uz,t, u j,t, and uτ,t are mean zero i.i.d. processes with variances σ2z , σ2j , and σ
2
τ, respec-
tively.
The parameter x measures habits in consumption, Gc is the growth rate of consump-
tion along a balanced growth path, and Γx and jx are scaling factors, discussed in more
detail below. Households incur a utility flow from housing, given by jt jx ln
(
hx,t
)
, but suf-
fer a disutility cost of adjusting their housing stock of the form
φhx
(
hx,t
)
= φxφ
h
x
(
hx,t
hx
− 1
)2
The disutility cost of housing adjustment captures the search/psychological costs of buy-
ing a home which are distinct from costs associated with buying/selling other types of
financial assets.
Discount factor heterogeneity between households induces heterogeneity in the
marginal utility of saving across households. All else equal, impatient households have
a higher marginal utility of immediate consumption relative to patient households, in-
ducing a desire to trade intertemporally. In equilibrium, patient households save while
impatient households borrow. Impatient households maximize (3.1) by choosing con-
sumption ci,t, labor supply ni,t, housing hi,t, and loans bi,t subject to their budget constraint
ci,t + qthi,t +
1 + rb,t−1
1 + pit
bi,t−1 = wi,tni,t + qthi,t−1 + bi,t (3.2)
where qt is the real price of housing (in terms of the composite final good), rb,t is the net
nominal lending rate, pit = PtPt−1 − 1 is the rate of inflation of the composite final good from
date t − 1 to date t, and wi,t is the impatient household real wage. Impatient households
cannot commit to repay their debt to the financial sector and are free to default in period t
on loans taken out at period t − 1. In Appendix D I show that this type of limited enforce-
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ment problem between impatient households and the financial sector yields a borrowing
limit for impatient households of the form
bi,t(1 + rb,t) ≤ miEtqt+1(1 + pit+1)hi,t (3.3)
which is a standard collateral constraint as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello
(2005). The exogenous parameter mi ∈ (0, 1) is the steady state loan-to-value (LTV) ratio
for residential mortgages.
When the borrowing constraint binds, housing is valued as collateral for borrowing
in addition to it providing utility and being a store of wealth. Because of the collateral
value of housing, housing preference shocks induce shifts in the demand for credit by
impatient households. Housing preference shocks of this form have been used to mea-
sure the importance of the housing market in business cycle fluctuations by Iacoviello
(2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2009), Liu et al. (2010), and Walentin (2011). Housing prefer-
ence shocks are generally thought of being representative of any omitted characteristics
of housing demand such as housing-related taxes and social housing preference shocks -
see Iacoviello and Neri (2009) for a discussion. Liu et al. (2009) derives a micro founded
model of housing preference shocks whereby changes in mortgage LTV ratios shift hous-
ing demand in a way consistent with housing preference shocks.
Each patient household is composed of a continum of members of two types: workers
and bankers. Workers supply labor, and bankers manage the household’s own financial
intermediary. At any moment in time the fraction 1− f of household members are workers
and the remaining fraction f are bankers. Over time an individual can switch between the
two occupations: a banker will remain a banker with probability θ, which is independent
of history. Thus each period (1− θ) f bankers exit and become workers - an identical mass
of workers randomly become bankers, keeping the relative proportion of each type fixed.
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The household provides its new bankers with initial capital, described below.
Two additional assumptions generate a meaningful role for the financial sector with-
out increasing the level of heterogeneity in the model: (1) A household’s savings is de-
posited in intermediaries other than those managed by their own household, and (2)
within the family of any household there is perfect consumption insurance.
Patient households maximize (3.1) by choosing consumption, housing, labor supply,
and deposits dt subject to their budget constraint
cp,t + dt + qthp,t = wp,tnp,t +
1 + rt−1
1 + pit
dt−1 + qthp,t−1 + Πt (3.4)
Patient households receive net nominal interest rt from deposits as well as retained earn-
ings from exiting bankers and profits from retailers, Πt. Optimality conditions for all
decision problems are in Appendix D.
3.1.2 Entrepreneurs (intermediate good sector)
Entrepreneurs combine capital, housing, and labor services of households to produce a
homogeneous intermediate good sold in a competitive market. The intermediate good is
produced with a constant returns technology represented by
Yt = Ac,t
((
ndi,t
)(1−σ) (
ndp,t
)σ)1−α−ν
Kαt−1h
ν
e,t−1 (3.5)
where ndx,t is the the quantity of labor demanded, and Kt−1 and he.t−1 are the quantities of
capital and housing accumulated at the end of date t − 1, respectively. The parameter σ
determines the distribution of the wage share, and economic relevance, between patient
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and impatient households. Output is subject to TFP shocks which follow
ln
(
Ac,t
)
= t ln (1 + γc) + ln
(
vc,t
)
, ln
(
vc,t
)
= ρc ln
(
vc,t−1
)
+ uc,t
where uc,t is a mean zero i.i.d. shock with variance σ2c . The stochastic stationary portion
of the consumption good technology process is given by vc,t, while γc is the deterministic
growth rate of the productivity process.
The end of period capital stock Kt is composed of investment in new capital, It, and
purchases of used, previously installed capital, Kb,t:
Kt = Kb,t +
1 − Ω2
(
It
It−1
−GI
)2 It (3.6)
Entrepreneurs choose consumption ce,t, housing stock he,t, used previously installed
capital Kb,t, investment in new capital It, and loans be,t to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βeGc)t Γe ln
(
ce,t − ece,t−1) , 0 < βe < βp (3.7)
subject to the flow of funds constraint
ce,t+qthe,t+
It
Ak,t
+
1 + rb,t−1
1 + pit
be,t−1+pk,tKb,t+wi,tni,t+wp,tnp,t = be,t+qthe,t−1+(1−δ)pk,tKt−1+ YtXt (3.8)
where 1Xt ≡
Pwt
Pt
is the relative price of the intermediate good and pk,t is the relative price
of used capital. The relative price of investment is determined by investment-specific
technological change Ak,t, which follows
ln
(
Ak,t
)
= t ln (1 + γk) + ln
(
vk,t
)
, ln
(
vk,t
)
= ρk ln
(
vk,t−1
)
+ uk,t
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where uk,t is a mean zero i.i.d. shock with variance σ2k . Capital depreciates at rate δ ∈ (0, 1).
As with impatient households, entrepreneurs cannot commit to repay their debt which
limits the amount entrepreneurs can borrow each period to
be,t(1 + rb,t) ≤ me,t (Etqt+1(1 + pit+1)he,t + (1 − δ)Etpk,t+1(1 + pit+1)Kt) (3.9)
where me,t ∈ (0, 1) is an exogenous component of the LTV ratio on business loans and
evolves according to
ln
(
me,t
)
= (1 − ρe) ln (me) + ρe ln (me,t−1) + ue,t
with ue,t being a mean zero, i.i.d. shock with variance σ2e . When the borrowing con-
straint binds, changes in expected future house prices and installed capital prices induce
endogenous shifts in the demand for credit by entrepreneurs. Shocks to the LTV ratio
exogenously shifts the demand for credit by entrepreneurs. This type of disturbance to
credit conditions on the production-side of the economy has been utilized in estimated
DSGE models by Liu et al. (2010) and Jermann and Quadrini (2011).
3.1.3 Financial Sector
The financial sector, which is operated by members of the patient household that are
bankers, channels funds from patient households to impatient households and en-
trepreneurs. Bankers are themselves subject to a financial friction which builds on the
framework of Gertler and Karadi (2011), the differences being the addition of multiple
assets on the bank balance sheet - residential mortgages and business loans, and the ad-
dition of financial sector funding shocks. Denote by N jt the amount of net worth that
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banker j has at the end of period t; D jt the deposits the banker obtains from patient house-
holds, and B jit, B jet as the total amount of residential and business loans made by banker
j, respectively, with B jt ≡ B jit + B jet. The intermediary balance sheet is given by
B jt = N jt + D jt
At period t + 1, bankers pay the real amount Rt ≡ 1+rt1+pit+1 on deposits acquired at date t.
Over time, the banker’s net worth evolves as the difference between earnings on assets
and interest payments on liabilities:
N jt+1 = Rb,t
(
B jit + B jet
)
− RtD jt
=
(
Rb,t − Rt) (B jit + B jet) + RtN jt
where Rb,t ≡ 1+rb,t1+pit+1 . Let βkpΓt,t+k be the stochastic discount factor the banker applies at t to
earnings at t + k. Since the banker will not fund assets with a discounted return less than
the discounted cost of borrowing, then for the banker to be willing to operate in period t
the following participation constraint must apply:
EtβpΓt,t+1
(
Rb,t − Rt) ≥ 0 (3.10)
In a frictionless funding market for bankers, the participation constraint holds with
equality by necessity (rb,t = rt), otherwise the banker would demand an infinite amount
of funds. With imperfect funding markets - in particular, a constraint on the amount a
banker can borrow, the relation can hold with strict inequality in equilibrium. Provided
the participation constraint (3.10) holds for any future horizon t + k, k = 1, 2, . . ., then it
pays for the banker to keep accumulating assets until exiting the industry. Accordingly,
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the banker’s objective is to maximize expected career wealth, given by
V jt = max Et
∞∑
k=0
(1 − θ)θkβk+1p Γt,t+1+kN jt+1+k
= max Et
∞∑
k=0
(1 − θ)θkβk+1p Γt,t+1+k
[(
Rb,t+k − Rt+k) (B jit+k + B jet+k) + Rt+kN jt+k]
To motivate a limit on borrowing by bankers, there is a moral hazard/costly enforcement
problem: at the beginning of the period the banker can choose to divert the fraction λt of
available funds from loans and instead transfer them back to the household of which he or
she is a member. The cost to the banker is that the depositors can force the intermediary
into bankruptcy and recover the remaining fraction 1 − λt of assets. The fraction λt is
exogenously determined and follows
ln (λt) = (1 − ρλ) ln (λ) + ρλ ln (λt−1) + uλ,t
where uλ,t is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance σ2λ.
In the event of bankruptcy depositors receive the remaining fraction of assets only at
the end of the period, with no further opportunity to invest. For patient households to be
willing to supply funds to the banker, the following incentive constraint must be satisfied:
V jt ≥ λt
(
B jit + B jet
)
In Appendix D I show that V jt can be expressed as
V jt = ϑtB jt + ηtN jt
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where
ϑt = Et
[
(1 − θ)βpΓt,t+1 (Rb,t − Rt) + θβpΓt,t+1xt,t+1ϑt+1] (3.11)
ηt = 1 − θ + θβpEtΓt,t+1zt,t+1ηt+1 (3.12)
xt,t+i ≡ B jt+iB jt , zt,t+i ≡
N jt+i
N jt
The expressions ϑt and ηt represent the marginal returns to participating in the financial
sector along two dimensions: ϑt is the expected discounted marginal gain to the banker
of expanding assets, holding net worth N jt constant, while ηt is the expected discounted
value of additional net worth, holding assets constant.
The incentive constraint can now be expressed as
ηtN jt + ϑtB jt ≥ λtB jt
In Appendix D I show that the incentive constraint binds in equilibrium, yielding
B jt =
ηt
λt − ϑtN jt
Taking leverage to be the ratio of total assets to total equity, then the leverage of banker j
is
φt ≡ ηt
λt − ϑt (3.13)
which is composed of an endogenous component (ηt, ϑt) and an exogenous component
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(λt). Bank net worth can now be expressed as
N jt+1 =
[(
Rb,t − Rt) φt + Rt]N jt (3.14)
With no idiosyncratic shocks in the financial sector, I focus on an equilibrium with
symmetric balance sheets across bankers. In this case, aggregating across individual de-
mands for deposits yields
Bt = φtNt (3.15)
Dt = Bt − Nt = (φt − 1)Nt (3.16)
where Bt, Dt and Nt are aggregate financial sector assets, deposits, and net worth, respec-
tively. Combining (3.13) with (3.15) forms an upward-sloping supply of loanable funds
in the lending rate rb,t. Similarly, combining (3.13) and (3.16) forms a downward-sloping
demand for deposits in rt.
The evolution of net worth Nt follows from the accounting identity that it is the sum
of net worth of existing bankers, Net, and the net worth of new bankers, Nnt:
Nt = Net + Nnt
Since the fraction θ of bankers at t were also bankers at t − 1, Net is given by
Net = θzt−1,tNt−1
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where
zt,t+1 = (Rb,t − Rt)φt + Rt (3.17)
For new bankers, the household transfers the fraction ω1−θ of total final period assets (1 −
θ)Bt−1 of exiting bankers. Thus, Nnt = ω Bt−11+pit so Nt evolves according to
Nt = θzt−1,tNt−1 + ω
Bt−1
1 + pit
(3.18)
What is a financial sector funding shock?
Financial sector funding shocks are shocks to the banker diversion capability λt, and induce
shifts in the supply of credit. A positive shock to the diversion capability λt increases
the incentive to exit the financial sector through a higher return from diverting assets.
Because of the binding incentive constraint, the returns to participating in the financial
sector, and not divert assets, must rise. In equilibrium, the returns from not diverting
rises through a contraction in leverage, i.e., a contraction in the supply of credit. A con-
traction in the supply of credit forces the lending-deposit spread higher, which increases
the returns to participating through ϑt. Thus, a positive shock to λt constitutes a negative
financial sector funding shock.
The banker diversion capability λt could be thought of as a measure of the complexity
of financial assets held by the banker (from the perspective of the depositor). The higher
the degree of complexity, the easier it is for bankers to divert resources and subsequently
the tighter is the borrowing constraint faced by bankers. Green and Wachter (2005) and
Gorton (2010) discusses how securitization can reduce the complexity of mortgage loans
to potential investors, which can lead to an increase in the supply of credit as investors
find it easier to evaluate the asset. Simsek and Caballero (2011) provide a model where
shocks to complexity induce contractions in the supply of credit as potential investors
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become unable to evaluate assets.
Alternatively, Gorton (2010) argues that the legal structure of Special Purpose Vehicles,
the legal entities through which securitized assets must be passed through from origina-
tion to sale, effectively reduced moral hazard problems between managers of MBIs and
depositors/investors by limiting the amount of discretion available to financial managers.
In this more direct interpretation of λt, financial innovation and deregulation encourag-
ing securitization is captured through a decrease in λt, leading to an increase in the sup-
ply of credit through higher leverage. Gorton also argues that amendments to the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code in the 1980s and later in 2005 made it harder for MBIs to divert assets
through bankruptcy proceedings. In terms of the model, a change in bankruptcy law
making it harder to divert assets would also imply an increase in the supply of credit
through a decline in λt.
In Chapter 4.1 I provide reduced form evidence to evaluate these two interpretations
of λt.
3.1.4 Final Goods Producers
Following Bernanke et al. (1999), nominal rigidities enter the economy through a contin-
uum of monopolistic retailers (owned by patient households) who purchase the interme-
diate good from entrepreneurs at relative price 1Xt , costlessly differentiate it, then resell
the differentiated goods in the final goods market. Retailers are subject to a Calvo price-
setting rigidity, with ζ ∈ (0, 1) denoting the probability that any given retailer is unable
to optimally reset her price in period t. Firms unable to optimally reset prices in period
t index their date t price according to the previous inflation rate with elasticity ι. These
assumptions lead to a Phillips curve of the form
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ln (pit) − ι ln (pit−1) = βpGc (Et ln (pit+1) − ι ln (pit)) − pi ln
(Xt
X
)
+ upi,t
where pi =
(1−ζ)(1−βpGcζ)
ζ
and upi,t is a mean-zero, i.i.d. cost-push shock with variance σ2pi.
3.1.5 Monetary Policy and Market Clearing Conditions
Monetary policy is conducted according to a Taylor rule of the form
1 + rt = (1 + rt−1)ρr
(
(1 + pit)ρpi
(
Yt
GcYt−1
)rY
(1 + r)
)1−ρr ur,t
st
where ur,t is a mean-zero, i.i.d. policy shock with variance σ2r and st is an AR(1) process
with mean zero i.i.d. shocks capturing persistent deviations of inflation from its steady
state level, as in Iacoviello and Neri (2009).
The market clearing conditions consist of those for the goods market
Yt = ci,t + cp,t + ce,t +
It
Ak,t
(3.19)
labor market
ndi,t = ni,t, n
d
p,t = np,t (3.20)
used (previously installed) capital market
Kb,t = (1 − δ)Kt−1 (3.21)
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financial markets
Be,t = be,t, Bi,t = bi,t, Dt = dt (3.22)
and housing market
hi,t + hp,t + he,t = Ht (3.23)
The supply of housing is given by Ht, and is exogenous. Iacoviello and Neri (2009) find
differences in the long run technological growth rates of the housing and non-housing
sectors to be an important factor in explaining the trend growth of real house prices. To
allow for this characteristic without adding the complexity of residential investment and
intersectoral labor supply decisions, I allow the supply of housing Ht to grow determin-
istically at rate 1 + γh. Appendix D contains the full set of equilibrium conditions and
stationary-inducing transformation of the model. Along the balanced growth path, ag-
gregate consumption, investment, house prices, and the housing stock grow at rates
Gc = ((1 + γk)α(1 + γh)ν(1 + γc))
1
1−α
GI = Gk = (1 + γk)Gc
Gq = (1 + γh)−1Gc
Gh = 1 + γh
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Labor supply, interest rates, inflation, and leverage are stationary in the untransformed
model. All remaining variables grow at the rate of consumption Gc. With the structural
model in hand, the next section discusses the method used for taking the model to the
data.
3.2 Estimation
The parameters of the model are estimated using Bayesian methods.1 First, the model is
linearized around the zero-inflation deterministic steady state along the balanced growth
path. In the steady state, the borrowing constraints of impatient households and en-
trepreneurs bind as does the incentive constraint of the financial sector. These constraints
bind in the linearized model, and in subsequent simulations the equilibrium conditions
which characterize binding constraints are verified to hold.
Second, using the state space representation of the linearized model, the likelihood
function is computed using the Kalman filter. Combining the likelihood function with
prior distributions for the parameters, posterior distributions are estimated using the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
3.2.1 Data
The data is plotted in Figure C.5. The sample uses quarterly U.S. data from 1985.Q1-
2010.Q4, which focuses on the period in which MBIs have played an increasingly impor-
tant role in the mortgage market. Eight data series are used for estimation: personal con-
sumption expenditures; business fixed investment; real wages and hours in the non-farm,
1See Sungbae and Schorfheide (2007) for a review of Bayesian estimation in DSGE models.
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non-construction sector; real house prices; credit market lending in mortgages and busi-
ness loans; and security broker-dealer leverage. Mortgage lending is given by the amount
of outstanding residential mortgages. Business loans are credit market instruments held
by all non-farm, non-financial corporate and non-corporate businesses. Broker-dealer
leverage is the ratio of total financial assets to equity. All credit market and broker-dealer
data is taken from the Flow of Funds.
Leverage is chosen to summarize MBI behavior for two reasons: (1) it is a reliable
indicator of financial cycles, and (2) it can identify a housing demand shock from a shock
originating in the financial sector.2 The focus on security broker-dealers, as opposed to
using aggregate data across multiple types of intermediaries, is to avoid the distortion of
the true leverage of an intermediary which results from aggregating balance sheets and
double-counting cross positions held by different types of financial firms - see Adrian and
Shin (2010a). Broker-dealers, which by definition are any financial institution which buys
and sells securities on behalf of its clients or on its own account, include a large swath of
MBIs, including all the major investment banks which existed over the sample period.
Appendix A contains a detailed description of the data. As in Iacoviello and Neri
(2009), I remove the level and keep the trend in the data used in the estimation. Due
to the large divergence in real wage growth and consumption growth over the sample
period and citing the discussion of the mismeasurement of wages in Sullivan (1997), I
allow for measurement error in wages. The measurement equations are in Appendix D.
2See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009); Adrian and Shin (2009); Taylor and Schularick (2009); Adrian and Shin
(2010b), Genakoplos (2009), and Owsley (2011).
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3.2.2 Calibrated Parameters
A subset of the model parameters are calibrated because they are either difficult to esti-
mate or are better identified by using other information. I calibrate the discount factors,
depreciation rate, factor shares, banker transition probability, persistence of the inflation
objective shock, steady state values of the markup, utility weights on housing, LTV ra-
tios, and banker diversion capability. Table B.1 summarizes the calibrated values. Table
B.2 lists the moments used for the calibration.
Beginning with parameters that pin down financial market moments, the patient
household discount factor determines the steady state deposit rate. I set βp to 0.9925
in order to match an annual return of 3%. Given the steady state deposit rate, I fix the
steady state lending spread rb − r = 0.0042 in order to match an annual 1.7% spread be-
tween the 30-year fixed mortgage rate and 10-year T-bill over the sample period. Steady
state financial sector leverage is set to 21, which matches that in the data for security
broker-dealers over the sample period. The banker transition probability θ is set to 0.9,
implying an average tenure in a specific intermediary of three years, which is consistent
with survey data on broker-dealers.3 Given a value for the lending spread, patient house-
hold discount factor, banker transition probability θ, and leverage, the steady state banker
diversion parameter λ is determined.
Moving on to the parameters which pin down housing market moments, the housing
utility scaling factors, ji and jp, are set to 1.87 and 0.22, respectively. These values enable
the model to match a household real estate wealth-to-output ratio of around 1.7 and a
mortgage debt-to-output ratio of 0.64.4 The steady state LTV ratios for mortgages and
business loans are set to 0.85 and 0.55, respectively, which match averages in the U.S. and
3http://www.advisorone.com/2011/02/15/pershing-study-forecasts-shortage-of-bd-reps
4To be consistent with the model, output is defined as the sum of consumption and business fixed in-
vestment.
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other economies with liberalized credit markets over the sample period.5
Parameters which pin down production sector moments are the depreciation rate, cap-
ital and housing share. These are set to 0.03, 0.325, and 0.035, respectively. With these val-
ues, the steady state attains an investment share of output of 17% and a business sector
real estate wealth-to-output ratio of 1.3, as in the data.6
Because the steady state markup is not well identified in the model equations, I set the
steady state markup to 1.15, which is consistent with Iacoviello and Neri (2009) and other
standard calibrations of DSGE models. Like in the Iacoviello and Neri estimation, the
autocorrelation of the inflation persistence shock ρs is not well identified in estimations.
Following Iacoviello and Neri, I set this value to 0.975, implying an annual autocorrela-
tion of trend inflation around 0.9.
3.2.3 Priors
Prior distributions are detailed in Table B.3. Overall, the priors are consistent with pre-
vious studies - in particular, Iacoviello and Neri (2009), Smets and Wouters (2007), and
Justiniano et al. (2011).
For the exogenous processes, persistence is beta distributed, with mean and standard
deviation 0.80 and 0.10, respectively. Standard errors for the shocks follow inverse gamma
distributions, and are scaled as in Walentin (2011) to aid in the computation of the mode.
Scaling factors are chosen to match the orders of magnitude of shock standard deviations
in Iacoviello and Neri (2009). Otherwise, no further stance on the relative volatility of
each shock is taken.
5See Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), Kariner (2009), and Green and Wachter (2005).
6Real estate ratios were calculated using U.S. Federal Reserve Flow of Funds tables B.100, B.102 and
B.103.
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For the parameters governing the degree of nominal and real rigidities, the prior mean
for the average duration of prices is set to around three quarters. The number of firms
indexing prices to inflation is centered at 50%. Households have stronger prior habits in
consumption than entrepreneurs, with habit persistence centered at 0.80 and 0.50, respec-
tively. Based on Christiano et al. (2005), the adjustment cost parameters, Ω and φhp, follow
a gamma distribution with mean 2.1. In the baseline estimation, impatient households do
not incur housing adjustment costs. In Chapter 3.3 I show that adding housing adjust-
ment costs for impatient households results in a deterioration of the marginal likelihood
of the model.
The remaining parameters concern technology, preferences, and policy. Determin-
istic growth rates of the technological processes, γc, γk, and γh, follow normal distribu-
tions with relatively tight priors centered at their respective counterparts in the sample
data. The sample technological process growth rates are backed out using sample growth
rates in consumption, investment, and house prices together with the expressions for the
model trends. The elasticity of labor supply for households, determined by χi, χp are both
gamma distributed with a mean of 2. The prior mean of the labor income share of patient
households is set to 0.65, following Iacoviello and Neri (2009). The Taylor rule parameters
ρy, ρr and ρpi are centered at 0, 0.75, and 1.2.
3.2.4 Posteriors
Posterior means, standard deviations, and percentile intervals are summarized in Table
B.3. Details on the estimation procedure, including convergence diagnostics and plots of
the posterior distributions, are in Appendix D.7
7Draws from the posterior distribution of the parameters are obtained using the random walk version of
the Metropolis algorithm. Tables and figures are based on two chains, each with 350,000 draws. The jump
distribution was chosen to be normal with covariance matrix equal to the Hessian of the posterior density
evaluated at the maximum. The scale factor was chosen to obtain an acceptance rate of about 29 percent.
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At the posterior mean, the labor share of impatient households is 31%. Consumption
habits are lower for entrepreneurs (e = 0.41) relative to patient households (p = 0.48) and
impatient households (i = 0.77). The stronger habit persistence for impatient households
could result from the fact that they face the poorest consumption smoothing possibilities,
requiring a higher degree of habit persistence to reconcile the persistence of consumption
in the data. For possibly a similar reason, impatient households have a lower labor supply
elasticity than patient households (1.67 vs. 2.08). The posteriors of the adjustment cost
parameters are relatively tight, with means lower than their prior (Ω = 1.06 and φhp = 0.06).
The estimated technological parameters imply average annual growth rates of con-
sumption, investment, and house prices of 2.2%, 1.2%, and 0.55%, respectively, which is
close in line with the sample. The estimated trends and percentile intervals are plotted in
Figure C.6, and are based on 1, 000 draws from the posterior.
For the remaining parameters, prices are optimally reset with a mean frequency of
about seven quarters. There is almost full price indexation at the mean (ι = 0.96). The
monetary policy reaction coefficients are consistent with previous estimated New Key-
nesian models, with a high degree of interest rate smoothing (ρr = 0.72), and a response
to inflation approximately six-times as large as that to output. The estimated exogenous
process are generally very persistent. The housing demand, entrepreneur credit, and
financial funding shock have autocorrelation coefficients of 0.99, 0.98, and 0.91, respec-
tively.
Convergence was assessed according to the Brooks-Gelman diagnostics.
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3.3 Properties of the Model
3.3.1 Impulse Responses
Financial Sector Funding Shock
Figure C.7 displays the median quarterly impulse responses to a negative one standard
deviation financial sector funding shock. A negative funding shock is a positive shock
to the banker’s diversion capability λt, which on impact increases the incentive to exit
the financial sector through a higher return from diverting assets. Because of the bind-
ing incentive constraint, the returns to participating in the financial sector, and not divert
assets, must rise. In equilibrium, the returns from not diverting rises through a contrac-
tion in leverage, i.e., a contraction in the supply of credit. A contraction in the supply
of credit forces the lending-deposit spread higher, which increases the returns to partic-
ipating through a higher return on lending (ϑt increases) and net worth (ηt increases).
The contraction in the supply of credit reduces consumption, investment, and housing
demand by impatient households and entrepreneurs. With falling aggregate demand, in-
flation falls and the central bank responds by lowering the deposit rate. The fall in the
deposit rate attenuates the equilibrium rise in the lending rate, however borrowers still
face oppressive credit burdens due to debt deflation.
The quantitative effect of the funding shock on economic activity is felt primarily in
investment. At its peak response, investment falls by 3.5%, and stays below its steady
state value for over two years. Consumption falls by less (.25% at its peak response), but
is more persistent, staying below its long run average for over five years. On the finan-
cial side of the economy, the funding shock has asymmetric effects on lending: mortgage
loans fall by 6% at their peak response while business loans fall by 2.5%. Compared to en-
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trepreneurs, households have fewer assets to use as collateral and have higher consump-
tion habits, making falling house prices and debt deflation induce a larger contraction in
borrowing. Leverage falls by 8% at its peak response, the largest of any of the variables,
and takes nearly three years to hit bottom.
The funding shock induces a rich interaction between financial sector leverage, collat-
eral effects from house prices, and debt deflation. To understand the contribution of each
of these effects, Figure C.8 breaks down the impulse responses by shutting down these
channels one at a time.
The debt deflation effect (black line) plays the largest quantitative role in the funding
shock. In this interaction, the funding shock contracts the supply of credit, forcing a
decline in inflation through reduced aggregate demand. Lower inflation increases the real
debt burdens of impatient households and entrepreneurs, which puts further downward
pressure on aggregate demand.
The second most important interaction comes from the collateral effect of house prices
on the demand for credit (red line). In this interaction, the contraction in the supply
of credit reduces the demand for housing by impatient households and entrepreneurs.
Lower house prices decrease credit demand through the collateral effect, which coupled
with the contraction in credit supply, results in a large equilibrium decline in credit. In
contrast, with exogenous borrowing limits that do not depend on house prices, there is
only a small decline in lending. The decline in lending is entirely from the decline in
credit supply (note the much larger increase in the spread relative to the baseline model).
The housing adjustment cost faced by patient households also plays a quantitative
role in the funding shock, particularly with respect to house prices (green line). Since the
contraction in credit brought about by the funding shock reduces housing demand among
impatient households and entrepreneurs, patient households must buy up the excess in
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equilibrium. Faced with an adjustment cost in housing, house prices must fall by more
for the market to clear. Through collateral and debt deflation effects, the further fall in
house prices propagates the shock across all macro and credit variables.
Housing Demand Shock
Figure C.9 displays the median quarterly impulse responses to a negative one stan-
dard deviation housing demand shock. The decline in housing demand depresses
house prices, forcing declines in the demand for credit by impatient households and
entrepreneurs through the collateral effect. Tighter credit limits force declines in con-
sumption, investment, and output. With the demand for final goods lower, inflation falls,
prompting a decline in the deposit rate by the central bank and further tightening of credit
conditions through debt deflation.
On impact of the shock leverage falls, but then rises persistently. To understand this,
first consider the initial period of the shock. Since financial sector net worth is determined
by the ex-post profitability of lending (which itself is only affected by inflation), then
leverage is almost entirely determined by total lending in the period of the shock. Thus,
the decline in the demand for credit lowers leverage initially. From the second period
onward, net worth drops dramatically through both lower spreads and lower lending.
The loss of net worth increases the marginal returns to participating in the financial sector
- participating allows the chance to recover lost net worth. With a smaller incentive to
divert funds, the funding market for bankers improves and leverage is allowed to rise.
The rise in leverage after a negative housing demand shock is consistent with the response
to an identified housing demand shock in a monetary VAR with house prices and leverage
(Owsley, 2011).
Compared to the funding shock, the quantitative effects are slightly smaller for con-
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sumption and half as large for investment. For financial variables, the decline in equilib-
rium business loans is also about half as large as with the funding shock. The difference
is due to the nature of the shock: a funding shock is initially a contraction in the supply of
credit across both mortgages and business loans. The contraction in the supply of credit
induces an endogenous contraction in the demand for credit through collateral effects and
debt deflation. On the other hand, the housing demand shock is initially a decline in the
demand for credit by households and entrepreneurs through collateral effects, debt defla-
tion, and lower aggregate demand. The decline in the profitability of lending induces an
endogenous increase in the supply of credit through the desire for bankers to recover lost
net worth, attenuating the contraction in credit demand by entrepreneurs which leads to
an overall smaller quantitative effect on macro variables.
Remaining Shocks
Figure C.10 displays the median quarterly impulse responses to a negative one standard
deviation entrepreneur credit shock. Figure C.11 displays the median quarterly impulse
responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock and Figure C.12 displays the re-
sponses to a negative TFP shock. Responses to the remaining shocks are in Appendix
D. Responses for these standard business cycle model shocks with respect to consump-
tion, business fixed investment, inflation, and house prices are consistent with those in
Iacoviello and Neri (2009), Jermann and Quadrini (2011), and Smets and Wouters (2007).
The qualitative response of leverage to the remaining shocks mimics the response to
the housing demand shock: leverage falls initially before persistently rising. This is be-
cause all the other shocks in the model feature a shift in the demand for credit which
outweighs shifts in credit supply, as in the housing demand shock. A negative credit de-
mand shock reduces banker profitability, increasing the returns for bankers to continue to
participate in the financial sector to recover lost net worth. Better aligned incentives re-
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sult in a loosening of their endogenous funding constraint, increasing leverage. Because
in these cases a contraction in credit demand is met with an increase in credit supply, the
endogenous leverage constraint faced by bankers acts to dampen outside macro shocks.
Much more will be said about the ability of endogenous MBI leverage to be a propagation
mechanism of business cycles in Chapter 4.2.
In summary, the financial funding, housing demand, and entrepreneur credit shock
all induce positive co-movement between macro variables, house prices, and credit. Of
these three shocks, the financial funding shock induces the largest quantitative response
among the variables. The key distinguishing feature among these shocks is the response
to financial sector leverage. The financial funding shock is the only shock in the model
which can produce persistent positive co-movement among leverage, macro variables,
house prices, and credit. Armed with an understanding of how the model works, I now
move to assessing the model’s performance in matching business cycle moments.
3.3.2 Cyclical Properties
Table B.4 contains data and model-generated correlations with respect to macro and fi-
nancial variables.8 Most of the 97.5% intervals generated by the model overlap those of
the data - the only exception being the correlation between output and house prices. The
model does a particularly good job in matching the correlations among macro variables
and that between house prices and mortgage credit. In general, the model tends to deliver
a stronger correlation between macroeconomic and financial variables than is suggested
by the data. The wide variability in the correlation between output and leverage is not
just a model phenomenon: the pre-crisis correlation in the data is around −0.10, while the
8The statistics were computed by taking 1, 000 draws from the posterior distribution and, for each draw,
simulating 100 artificial time series of a length equal to that in the data. The business cycle component of
each simulated series is extracted using the HP filter with smoothing parameter set to 1, 600.
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post-crisis correlation is 0.02. No other correlations listed in Table B.4 change significantly
either in sign or magnitude across the pre and post-crisis period.
The empirical measure used in the estimation for tightness in the supply of credit is
broker-dealer leverage. An alternative approach to measure shifts in credit supply is to
use a measure of interest rate spreads.9 To get a sense of how well the model can capture
changes in interest rate spreads when using only broker-dealer leverage in the estimation,
I compare the ex post lending-deposit spread based on the smoothed structural shocks to
Senior Loan Officer Survey (SLOS) data compiled by the Federal Reserve. Specifically, the
blue line in the top panel of Figure C.14 plots the net percentage of commercial bankers
increasing their lending rates to firms over their own cost of funds. A value greater than
zero indicates a majority of respondents are increasing their own lending-deposit spread.
A survey response that trends upward indicates increasing spreads are becoming more
pervasive throughout the economy. The results from this survey give a broad indication
of the direction of spreads received by financial institutions. Since other questions in the
survey account for tightening loan standards, the survey response on spreads could be
considered as an indicator of spread movements dictated by shifts in credit demand and
supply independent of default risk, which is closest to the reason why the spread in the
model fluctuates. The green line in the plot takes on a value of either 100 or −100. A value
of 100 indicates the ex post lending deposit spread is greater than its steady state value,
while a value of −100 indicates it is below its steady state value.
Generally the ex post spread in the model is above its steady state value whenever
there is an upward trend in the net percentage of bankers increasing spreads. The model
especially delivers an increasing spread during all three recessions and during the LTCM
crisis. Thus, using leverage of broker-dealers, together with credit market and macroeco-
nomic data in the estimation of the model, produces an ex posting lending-deposit spread
9For examples, see De Graeve (2008), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011a), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011b),
and Christiano et al. (2009).
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which has dynamics generally consistent with the dynamics of spreads indicated by the
SLOS.
3.3.3 Model Sensitivity: which frictions are empirically important?
The importance of the real and nominal rigidities in bringing the model closer to the
data is documented in Table B.5. Each column presents the marginal likelihood when re-
moving/dramatically reducing one friction.10 The most important rigidity in the model
(in terms of the marginal likelihood) is that of prices - reducing the Calvo probability to
ζ = 0.1 decreases the marginal likelihood by 43%. Investment adjustment costs are the
most costly real rigidity to eliminate - the marginal likelihood falls by 8% when removing
it. Just as important is the absence of housing adjustment costs for impatient households:
allowing for these causes the marginal likelihood to deteriorate by 8%. Of less impor-
tance, eliminating consumption habits or inflation indexation results in a small deteriora-
tion of the marginal likelihood of around 4%. Allowing for sticky wages has virtually no
effect on the likelihood (a loss of 1%).
In Appendix D I document the sensitivity of the model parameters to the real and
nominal rigidities in the model. Overall, the estimated parameters are robust to changes
in the frictions one by one. Eliminating frictions changes a small subset of parameters in
ways that compensate for the loss of the friction.
10The marginal likelihood is based on the Laplace approximation. See DeJong and Dave (2007) for a
formal introduction and comparison of alternative methods to compute the marginal likelihood of a DSGE
model.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1 Housing and MBIs: a source of business cycles
With the estimated model in hand, I now focus on analyzing the role of the housing mar-
ket and MBIs in the cycle. In this subchapter, the focus is on the importance of housing
demand shocks and financial funding shocks in driving business cycle fluctuations. Par-
ticular importance is placed on understanding their role in the Great Recession.
4.1.1 Variance Decomposition
Table B.6 contains the average median forecast error variance decomposition across 1, 4,
and 8 quarter horizons.1 Fluctuations in both macro and financial variables are largely
driven by macro shocks: macro shocks in the aggregate capture anywhere from 56%
(house prices) to 93% (consumption) of business cycle movements. Macro shocks have
a pervasive influence across both real and financial variables. Financial funding and
housing demand shocks, on the other hand, are not nearly as important in accounting
for fluctuations in consumption (4%) and investment (17%) as they are in accounting for
fluctuations in financial variables and house prices ( 19−42%). Having said that, financial
funding and housing demand shocks are by no means irrelevant. Combined, both shocks
account for at least 15% of fluctuations in investment, the t-bill rate, house prices, credit,
and broker-dealer leverage.
In relative terms, financial funding shocks are more important than housing demand
shocks. Funding shocks account for nearly five-times the forecast error variance of in-
1The values reported in the table are based on 1, 000 draws from the posterior distribution.
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vestment as housing demand shocks do (14% vs 3%), and twice that for consumption (3%
vs. 1.5%) and the t-bill rate. Among non-macro variables, funding and housing demand
shocks each account for 9% of leverage fluctuations, but funding shocks are more im-
portant in accounting for fluctuations in business loans (19% vs. 2%). Housing demand
shocks are significant in explaining only housing market movements, accounting for 21%
of mortgage fluctuations and 35% of house price fluctuations. Still, the funding shock
accounts for a respectable 10% and 7% of fluctuations in mortgages and house prices, re-
spectively. Housing demand shocks are much like entrepreneur credit shocks in terms
of their explanatory power in fluctuations. Although the entrepreneur credit shock ac-
counts for 19% of fluctuations in business loans, it accounts for no more than 6% of the
fluctuations of any other variable.
The funding, housing demand, and entrepreneur credit shock are all relatively unim-
portant in explaining consumption. This is a common feature among estimated DSGE
models with a housing demand shock or entrepreneur credit shock - see Iacoviello and
Neri (2009), Walentin (2011), and Jermann and Quadrini (2011). Justiniano et al. (2011)
also find that their shock to the marginal efficiency of investment is important in invest-
ment and output fluctuations but unimportant in consumption fluctuations. Insight into
this property is gained from examining Figure C.13. Here I plot the consumption response
to the financial, housing demand, and entrepreneur credit shocks against the response to
a TFP shock, which is one of the most important shocks in driving consumption fluctu-
ations. What distinguishes these shocks from the TFP shock is that they are essentially
redistributive. A (negative) financial funding shock prevents additional consumption by
impatient households and entrepreneurs, but allows for more consumption by patient
households since they, by construction, do not lend as much to bankers. Similarly, hous-
ing demand and entrepreneur credit shocks reduce consumption by borrowers through
collateral effects, but since the reduced consumption comes mostly through less borrow-
ing, patient households need not save as much and can increase their consumption. Thus
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all three of these shocks, because of their redistributive effects on consumption, imply
a much smaller consumption response compared to a shock which unambiguously de-
creases consumption by all agents, such as a TFP shock.
4.1.2 Historical Decomposition
Financial funding and housing demand shocks over the sample
I now examine the importance of the estimated financial funding and housing demand
shocks in explaining business cycle fluctuations observed in the sample, including the
Great Recession. While the variance decomposition reveals that both of these shocks
could play a nontrivial role in fluctuations, the large declines in consumption during
the Great Recession suggest these shocks could not have been the only shocks which hit
the economy. Once the role of housing demand and financial funding shocks has been
disentangled, I will analyze the influence of other shocks in the Great Recession.
Financial funding shocks
Figure C.15 plots the estimated exogenous processes over the observed sample period.
The banker diversion capability λt is determined by financial funding shocks. There is
a clear underlying downward trend in λt over the entire sample leading up to the Great
Recession, indicating positive funding shocks which have loosened the borrowing con-
ditions for broker-dealers have dominated during most of the sample. The largest fund-
ing shocks occurred after 2005: From 2005-2007, large positive funding shocks send λt
downward at its fastest rate over the sample. There is an unprecedented large negative
funding shock in late 2007, and subsequently further negative funding shocks through-
out the recession and recovery period, resulting in a (at least temporary) reversal in λt and
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tightening of broker-dealer borrowing conditions.
Understanding what the funding shock is actually capturing is important to inspire
confidence in the path it implies for macro and financial variables. To this end, the bot-
tom two panels of Figure C.14 are plots of the estimated funding shock against the change
in the average price of a 1-year credit-default swap (CDS) for the primary dealers, a subset
of broker-dealers that serve as trading counterparties of the New York Fed in its imple-
mentation of monetary policy.2 CDS only began being traded in the early 2000s. The
price of a CDS reflects the willingness of the buyer to bear the risk of default by a primary
dealer. Hence, changes in CDS prices reflect the ease to which MBIs can borrow. Overall,
changes in CDS prices for primary dealers track funding shocks well. Funding shocks
track the low/falling prices observed in the early to mid-2000s, the large, unprecedented
spike in prices seen at the peak of the financial crisis, as well as the fall and slight rise ob-
served after the crisis. The close alignment of funding shocks and CDS prices leading up
to and during the Great Recession indicates that the financial funding shock is capturing
changes in funding market conditions faced by MBIs.
Funding market conditions can also be influenced by regulation. Gorton (2010) ar-
gues that the most important necessary condition for sustained growth in MBI leverage
is the regulatory protections afforded to holders of repos, which were the main contract
used by MBIs to borrow. In 1984, an amendment to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code allowed
any holder of a repo to carry out necessary seizures of collateral if the seller of the repo
declared bankruptcy. While the initial provision in 1984 only included repos based on
Treasuries, agencies, bank CDs, and bankers’ acceptances, there was an additional reform
passed in 2005 which extended the protections to any repo using stock, bond, mortgages,
and other assets. These regulatory changes could rationalize the underlying downward
trend in λt as well as the particular sharp fall in λt beginning in 2005. This is because the re-
2A list of the primary dealers and further information about them can be found at http://www.
newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers_current.html.
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forms made it more difficult for sellers of repos to divert assets through costly bankruptcy
procedures, which in terms of the model would directly imply a decline in λt.
With evidence that the estimated funding shock does reflect actual funding market
conditions for MBIs, I now asses the role of funding shocks in observed fluctuations.
Figure C.16 plots the implied path of variables without funding shocks (red line) against
the data (black line). Large deviations between the data and what would have happened
without funding shocks indicates that funding shocks were important.
Beginning with macro variables, the role of funding shocks in consumption has been
much different than its role in investment. After the 1990 recession, funding shocks
supported higher consumption, an effect which lasts throughout the rest of the sample.
Rather than directly contributing to booms and busts in consumption, funding shocks
have allowed for higher consumption in the presence of other shocks which are mostly re-
sponsible for its business cycle movements. On the contrary, funding shocks have played
an important role in investment fluctuations, particularly in the downturn in investment
before the 1990 recession, the boom in investment during the 1991-1993 period, and most
of all, the boom in investment after the 2001 recession. The implied path of investment
without funding shocks would completely miss the rise in investment from 2001-2007,
and would also underpredict the fall in investment at the onset of the Great Recession.
Moving to non-macro variables, the role of funding shocks in house prices is some-
what between its role in investment and consumption. Beginning in the late 1990s, fund-
ing shocks contributed significantly to the early stages of the most recent housing boom.
In the later stages of the boom and early part of the bust, funding shocks helped sustain
house prices rather than drive house price changes. Funding shocks play a significant
role in explaining the underlying persistent rise in broker-dealer leverage from the early
1990s, and in particular to the steepest rise in leverage occurring just before the crisis.
However, abrupt changes in leverage, such as those experienced during the 2001 reces-
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sion and financial crisis, are explained by macro shocks. Funding shocks are important
in explaining credit movements, especially in expansionary phases of the business cycle,
over the entire sample. Positive funding shocks were almost entirely driving the con-
tinued expansion in mortgage credit from 2006-2008 and fall at the onset of the Great
Recession. Funding shocks become important in explaining the persistent low interest
rates beginning in 2008 - without funding shocks, the t-bill rate rises rapidly from 2008
onwards.
Housing demand shocks
Housing demand shocks, summarized by the evolution of jt in Figure C.15, have clearly
become larger over the sample period, with the largest positive shocks occurring from
2000-2005 followed by unprecedented negative shocks. The pattern of jt is similar to the
estimated housing demand shock in Iacoviello and Neri (2009). Iacoviello and Neri at-
tempt to explain innovations to housing preferences by mortgage market characteristics
such as initial fees and charges for a mortgage, the share of subprime mortgage origi-
nations out of total originations, the after-tax mortgage rate, and other economic funda-
mentals not well captured in a stylized macro model. They find these fundamentals can
only partially explain movements in housing preferences, leaving open the possibility of
“animal spirits” as a driver of jt.3
As suggested by the variance decomposition, the influence of housing demand shocks
in macro fluctuations is smaller than that of funding shocks. Housing demand shocks
play essentially no role in consumption fluctuations over the sample, but do play a non-
trivial role in the initial uptick in investment after the 2001 recession as well as the slow-
down in investment beginning in 2007. Housing demand shocks did positively contribute
to the most recent housing boom around the peak of the boom and most significant of all,
3See (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009) for a specific application to the housing market.
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in driving the collapse in house prices beginning in 2006.
In financial variables, housing demand shocks contribute significantly to the peak rise
in leverage before the onset of the Great Recession as well as the peak, and subsequent
fall, in mortgage loans from 2004-2010. Business loans are not driven by housing demand
shocks. Housing demand shocks contribute to the rise in the t-bill rate beginning in 2004
as well as the drop in the t-bill rate after 2005, with little influence in the t-bill rate in
previous business cycles.
Disentangling the Great Recession
Financial funding and housing demand shocks have had their most significant impact
over the sample in the period surrounding the Great Recession. An unprecedented neg-
ative housing demand shock was responsible for the collapse in house prices and played
a significant role in the contraction in mortgage lending. Financial funding shocks, after
driving the credit expansion and initially mitigating the effects of negative housing de-
mand shocks on credit, turned sharply negative. An unprecedented negative financial
funding shock largely drove the drop in investment, credit and to a lesser extent, house
prices.
However, these shocks do not explain the large drop in consumption leading up to and
at the onset of the Great Recession nor do they explain the tepid recovery in consumption
and investment from 2009-2011. With these features left to explain, I again turn to Figure
C.15. Unique to the Great Recession is not only the unprecedented large negative financial
funding and house demand shocks, but also unprecedented large negative TFP and cost-
push shocks. Monetary policy shocks, both in the form of i.i.d. and inflation-targeting
shocks, were large and expansionary at the onset of the Great Recession, but then turned
large and contractionary beginning in late 2009. Also in 2009 was a large positive discount
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factor shock.
Another uncharacteristic feature of the Great Recession is a relative easing of credit
conditions for entrepreneurs. From Figure C.15, me,t rises from 2005 onwards and espe-
cially trends upward during the recession. In prior recessions, credit for entrepreneurs
tightens before the recession and generally takes 2-3 years to recover. To investigate the
extent to which the estimated entrepreneur credit shock accurately captures credit mar-
ket dynamics faced by firms during the Great Recession, I compare the estimated shock
to Senior Loan Officer Survey data from the Federal Reserve. The second panel of Figure
C.14 plots the negative value of the entrepreneur credit shock against the net percentage
of bankers tightening credit conditions for firms more than for mortgages. If anything,
the estimated path for me,t underpredicts the easing of business credit conditions during
the Great Recession, as indicated by the SLOS.
Figures C.16-C.18 display the full historical decomposition of all the shocks, where
each decomposition is the implied path of variables without the specified shock. Large
deviations indicate the shock is important. The decline in consumption from 2006-2008
is almost entirely explained by negative technology shocks - in particular, negative TFP
shocks which began hitting the economy in 2007 and 2008. Technology shocks, particu-
larly TFP shocks, also played a role in the decline in investment and credit. The lack of a
stronger recovery in consumption has been largely caused by negative cost-push shocks
and positive discount factor shocks. Cost-push shocks have also played a role in the slow
recovery of investment. Monetary policy shocks were stimulative for investment, credit,
and house prices during the latter part of the recession but had little effect on consump-
tion. In the recovery, monetary policy shocks have been at best neutral or contractionary.
Looking at the t-bill rate explains why: from 2009 onwards, the presence of the zero lower
bound has acted as contractionary monetary policy, keeping the t-bill rate higher than
suggested by a Taylor Rule which responds only to output and inflation.
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In summary, the Great Recession is marked by an unprecedented coincidence of large
technology, financial funding, and housing demand shocks. Negative technology shocks
began the initial downturn, affecting consumption mainly but eventually contributing to
declines in credit. Housing demand shocks followed, causing a collapse in house prices
and contributing to declines in investment and further contractions in mortgage credit.
Financial funding shocks had been stimulative until 2007, mitigating the effects of neg-
ative technology and housing demand shocks on investment, credit, and leverage. But
ultimately, large negative financial funding shocks dealt the final blow, causing signifi-
cant further declines in investment and credit. Monetary policy, as reflected by the t-bill
rate, appears to have responded to housing demand shocks first, followed by TFP and
funding shocks. Funding shocks almost entirely account for interest rates being driven
to the zero-lower bound. In the recovery, negative cost-push shocks and discount factor
shocks have kept a lid on stronger gains in investment and consumption. Being con-
strained by the zero lower bound, monetary policy shocks have had a neutral or negative
impact on macro variables and credit.
Comparison to Stock and Watson (2012)
Despite the gulf between the methodology used by Stock and Watson (2012) and myself, a
strikingly similar conclusion about the Great Recession emerges: it was an unprecedented
coincidence of large shocks, of which only some were financial oriented.
Stock and Watson study the causes of the Great Recession by using a dynamic fac-
tor model with 198 variables covering macro aggregates, employment, money and credit,
house prices, inventories, interest rates and spreads, stock prices, exchange rates, and
oil prices. There are six shocks identified: oil, monetary policy, productivity, uncertainty
(captured through the VIX and an indicator of policy uncertainty), liquidity/financial
risk, and fiscal policy. Stock and Watson identify the shocks through an instrumental vari-
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ables technique (Mertens and Ravn, 2012), using as instruments estimated shocks from
DSGE models and indicators of exogenous disturbances from other outside sources. Stock
and Watson conclude that the Great Recession was caused by an unprecedented conflu-
ence of large shocks: an initial large oil shock, followed by multiple financial shocks.
Shocks to policy uncertainty are blamed for the slow recovery in consumption, while
monetary policy shocks have been neutral or contractionary.4 Financial shocks are shown
to have played a relatively small role in prior recessions. Stock and Watson are not the
first to provide evidence that an oil shock was the initial trigger for the Great Recession.
Hamilton (2009) shows through a careful analysis on consumption that had the oil price
spike of 2007-2008 not occurred, then the starting date for the Great Recession would have
been at least delayed several months.
Although the non-financial shocks which are important in the Stock and Watson anal-
ysis differ from those uncovered here, the distinction is more in name than in substance.
First consider the discrepancy between the initial shocks leading to the Great Recession:
Stock and Watson (together with Hamilton) provide evidence it was a series of oil price
shocks while I find it was a series of negative supply shocks in the form of TFP shocks.5
Peersman and Stevens (2010) estimate a multi-country DSGE model with endogenous oil
prices and use for oil in consumption, production, and investment. They decompose oil
supply shocks in the form of (1) shocks to capacity; (2) the market power of oil produc-
ing countries; and (3) productivity in oil-bearing reserves, from oil demand shocks in the
form of (1) own-market demand (speculation), and (2) other macroeconomic shocks from
the domestic and foreign economy. Peersman and Stevens find that all oil supply shocks
and own-market demand shocks have the same dynamics as TFP shocks. Without ex-
plicitly including oil in my model, the negative oil price shocks recovered in Stock and
4Gali et al. (2012) also finds monetary policy to have been contractionary throughout the recovery and
attributes the finding to the zero-lower-bound constraint on nominal interest rates.
5Jermann and Quadrini (2011) also find that a significant portion of the Great Recession was caused by
negative TFP shocks.
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Watson are likely being recorded as TFP shocks in my decomposition.
The other difference between my decomposition and that of Stock and Watson is in
the explanation of the slow recovery. Stock and Watson find shocks to policy uncertainty,
while I find the explanation to lie in discount factor shocks. Villaverde et al. (2011) builds
a New Keynesian model with fiscal policy uncertainty shocks, and finds the response
to investment and output to mimic those of a discount factor shock. To the extent that
increased policy uncertainty causes households and firms to restrain from spending until
the future path of economic policy is more certain, the discount factor shock in my model
would deliver a similar implication as policy uncertainty shocks found in the Stock and
Watson analysis.
4.1.3 Summary
Financial funding shocks are more important sources of business cycle fluctuations than
housing demand shocks. At business cycle frequencies, funding shocks account for as
much fluctuations in investment, house prices, credit, the t-bill rate, and broker-dealer
leverage as half the other shocks in the model. Funding shocks have played a role in
driving investment and credit fluctuations over the entire sample, with their largest in-
fluence beginning in the late 1990s. From this time through 2011, funding shocks propped
up consumption in the face of mostly negative technology shocks rather than drive its ups
and downs at business cycle frequencies. The biggest influence of funding shocks were
in driving the initial boom in housing prices after the 2001 recession, the large boom and
bust in investment from 2002-2007, as well as the expansion in credit and leverage - par-
ticularly from 2005-2007.
Housing demand shocks, on the other hand, mainly drive own-market fluctuations
in house prices and mortgage loans. Housing demand shocks are unimportant in under-
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standing fluctuations of macro and financial variables as well as house prices for most of
the sample. Housing demand shocks drove the most recent housing boom only late in
its life, from 2004-2006. During this time, housing demand shocks contributed to rising
broker-dealer leverage and also played a role in the expansion of investment, but did not
affect consumption or business loans. Unprecedented negative housing demand shocks
were responsible for the housing collapse and played a role in the contraction of mortgage
credit at the onset of the Great Recession.
4.2 Housing and MBIs: propagating business cycles
I now move to analyze the extent to which housing and MBIs can propagate shocks which
originate from other parts of the economy. To frame the analysis, I will exploit two well-
documented facts about housing and MBIs: (1) since the early 1980s, MBI leverage has
increased, and with higher leverage their share of total mortgage credit provided in the
economy has also risen (see Figure C.4); (2) The maximum LTV ratio for mortgage loans
has increased over time (Duca et al., 2011). If these long run changes in mortgage fi-
nance and MBIs alters the transmission mechanism of macro shocks, then housing and
MBIs matter in understanding business cycles irrespective of the importance of their own
shocks.
4.2.1 Effects of higher long-run MBI leverage
Leverage for MBIs has steadily increased since the 1980s: average MBI leverage was 15 in
1985 and 25 in 2007. Looking at the evolution of leverage in Figure C.5 as well as the es-
timated path for λt (Figure C.15) suggests an underlying low frequency structural change
for MBIs that is unrelated to the business cycle per se. With this implication in mind, I
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analyze how the volatility of macro and financial variables differs between a steady state
with low leverage and one with high leverage, keeping all other parameters at their pos-
terior median value. To implement these two steady states, I adjust the amount of start-up
capital brought into the financial system by new bankers. The high leverage steady state
regime, with leverage equal to 25, has an economy where a higher fraction of the supply
of credit to impatient households and entrepreneurs is dependent on the MBI funding
market.
Table B.7 presents the percentage change in the peak impulse response of macro and
financial variables in response to shocks across the two leverage regimes. The shocks that
are not listed in the table did not have a change in response across regimes.
Among the shocks for which the magnitude of the impulse response changed, there is
a clear finding: The volatility of a funding shock is amplified across all variables, whereas
he volatility of all other shocks is dampened across all variables with exception to broker-
dealer leverage.
To understand these results, recall from Chapter 3.3 that for all non-funding shocks,
the supply of credit shifts endogenously (through leverage) in a way that offset shifts in
the demand for credit. For example, a shock which decreases the demand for credit low-
ers the profitability of bankers, decreasing the returns to diverting funds and exiting the
financial sector. With less incentive to divert funds and exit the financial sector, fund-
ing market conditions improve - leverage rises, increasing the supply of credit. In the
steady state with higher leverage, that feature is amplified, making MBIs absorb more of
the volatility induced by outside shocks. The reason that leverage adjustments are larger
comes from the tradeoff that must be balanced in equilibrium for the funding market to
work: the marginal benefit to diverting (defaulting) vs. the marginal benefit from staying
in the financial sector. With higher long run leverage, bank net worth is more sensitive
to leverage fluctuations - see equation 3.14. By extension, the marginal benefit from stay-
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ing in the financial sector is also more sensitive to leverage fluctuations. Since leverage is
the market mechanism through which the tradeoff between diverting and participating is
balanced, larger swings in this tradeoff imply larger swings in leverage and the supply of
credit. In the case of outside shocks, larger swings in leverage work to cushion the shocks
and lower macro volatility. But in the case of a funding shock, which through collateral
and debt deflation effects induces a shift in credit demand which further tightens credit
in the economy, larger swings in credit supply produce higher macroeconomic volatility.
The upper panel of Figure D.2.3 presents the median variance decomposition for both
steady states. In the higher leverage environment the financial funding shock rises in
importance for driving business cycles - it accounts for three times more of the forecast
error variance in house prices and investment as it does in the low leverage environment.
Monetary policy shocks become particularly less relevant in driving fluctuations - their
importance in driving investment, consumption, and house prices is cut in half. Housing
demand and entrepreneur credit shocks also become less relevant in driving business
cycles.
4.2.2 Effects of higher long-run LTV limits
Another feature marking the evolution of mortgage finance in the last 25 years is the rising
average household mortgage LTV ratio. For first-time homebuyers, Duca et al. (2011)
document average LTVs of 80 − 85% in the 1980s which rose to the 90 − 95% range from
2000-2005. While there exists some variation in LTV ratios at business cycle frequencies,
the dominant feature is a clear upward trend over most of the sample period. Thus,
similar to the gradual increase in security broker-dealer leverage over the sample, changes
in the mortgage market are likely better captured as a long-run shift in the mortgage
market as opposed to a transitory shock. To capture the effects of this structural change
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on the propagation of shocks in the business cycle, I compare the change in volatility of
macro and financial variables when moving from a “low LTV” steady state (mi = 0.8) to a
“high LTV” steady state (mi = 0.95).
Table B.8 presents the percentage change in the peak impulse response of macro and
financial variables in response to shocks across the two LTV regimes. The shocks that
are not listed in the table did not have a change in response across regimes. Apart from
the propagation of business loans, the higher LTV steady state features higher volatility
across all shocks and variables. Iacoviello (2005) and Walentin (2011) find a similar result
with respect to consumption, but do not look at house prices, credit, or broker-dealer
leverage.
The increased volatility comes from stronger debt deflation and collateral effects. In
the higher LTV steady state, the real debt burden of impatient households is higher, mak-
ing their disposable income more sensitive to debt deflation and fluctuations in borrow-
ing constraints brought about by collateral effects. As a result, any shock causes dispos-
able income for impatient households to fluctuate more widely, leading to larger fluctua-
tions in consumption, credit, house prices, and leverage.
The lower panel of Figure D.2.3 presents the median variance decomposition for both
steady states. Housing demand shocks are particularly amplified with higher LTV limits,
accounting for ten-times more of the forecast error variance in consumption as in the
low LTV steady state, and twice as much of the forecast error variance in investment
and broker-dealer leverage. The financial funding shock also becomes more important in
driving business cycles, particularly with respect to house prices and consumption.
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4.2.3 Summary
Although the exercise is suggestive, the implications of the model in an environment
of higher long-run leverage for MBIs and LTV limits for households makes both sectors
important in understanding business cycles. If the early 1980s are considered to be an en-
vironment with “low LTV, low leverage,” while the 2000s are a “high LTV, high leverage”
environment, then this exercise offers an additional reason why housing and MBIs matter
so much more in explaining the Great Recession relative to earlier in the sample. Higher
LTV limits for households and leverage for MBIs makes the economy unambiguously
more vulnerable to financial funding shocks, and potentially more vulnerable to housing
demand shocks.
Looking beyond the Great Recession, the major implication of this exercise - that MBIs
reduce volatility from outside shocks but only at a cost of increasing their own impor-
tance in creating volatility - lends support to two very different (but not mutually exclu-
sive) views about finance in the business cycle. On the one hand, the model is consistent
with the idea that the financial innovation of the 1980s and 1990s, which created the envi-
ronment for MBIs, contributed to the Great Moderation.6 On the other hand, the model is
also consistent with the argument that too much reliance on market-based intermediation
can put the economy at risk of shocks originating from within the financial sector, an idea
the goes all the way back to at least Minksy (1982) but was articulated at the 2005 Federal
Reserve Jackson Hole Symposium just before the housing bust by Rajan (2005).
6See Bernanke (2004) for an overview of the main hypothesis for the Great Moderation. For arguments
that financial innovation played a role in the Great Moderation, see, for example, Dynan et al. (2006) and
Greenspan (1999). For evidence that finance was not important in the Great Moderation (which doesn’t
simply cite the financial crisis and Great Recession as proof), see den Haan (2010).
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The disparity of the evidence for the “smoking gun” which caused the Great Reces-
sion is not so much a failure of the economics profession to come to a consensus as it
is evidence that the Great Recession has no “smoking gun” cause. The structural evi-
dence from this paper supports a growing consensus that the Great Recession was an
unprecedented confluence of large shocks, only some of which were directly related to
the housing market and financial sector.
By and large, the housing market and intricacies of the financial sector were ignored
in mainstream business cycle analysis before the Great Recession.1 After disentangling
the role of housing demand shocks and shocks which affect funding conditions for secu-
rity broker-dealers, the assumed immateriality of the shocks prior to the Great Recession
seems less suspect. Traditional macroeconomic shocks can account for the majority of
movements in consumption, investment, house prices, credit, and even security broker-
dealer leverage. Financial funding shocks are most important in explaining rising MBI
leverage and credit over the sample. Positive funding shocks also supported higher con-
sumption in the 2000s, were the principal cause of the early stages of the most recent
housing boom, and accounted for investment dynamics around the 2000 and especially
2008 recession. Of less importance, housing demand shocks played a nontrivial role in
the dynamics in investment, credit, and house prices only late in the most recent housing
boom.
The impact of higher household and MBI leverage over the sample, in the wake of
financial innovation/deregulation during the 1980s/1990s, is at least as important as the
shocks originating from housing and MBIs. Deregulation, which allowed the environ-
1See Smets and Wouters (2007), Justiniano et al. (2011), and Christiano et al. (2009) for standard business
cycle models.
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ment for MBIs to increase in size and scope in determining the supply of credit, increases
the ability of the financial system to cushion the economy from macro shocks. However,
the economy is made more vulnerable to shocks originating within the financial sector.
Higher household indebtedness, despite increasing initial consumption, also makes the
economy more sensitive to shocks. In terms of the Great Recession, the analysis confirms
that not only was it a recession associated with uncharacteristically large financial and
housing market shocks, but the environment surrounding the shocks made the economy
more responsive to them.
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APPENDIX A
DATA SOURCES
• Aggregate consumption: Real Personal Consumption Expenditure (seasonally ad-
justed, deflated with the implicit price deflator for the nonfarm business sector), di-
vided by the Civilian Noninstitutional Population (CNP16OV, source: BLS). Source:
BEA.
• Business Fixed Investment: Real Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment (season-
ally adjusted, deflated with the implicit price deflator for the nonfarm business sec-
tor, divided by the CNP16OV. Source: BEA.
• Real House Prices: Census Bureau House Price Index (new one-family houses sold
including value of lot) deflated with the implicit price deflator for the nonfarm busi-
ness sector. Source: Census Bureau.
• Hours in the non-construction sector: Total Nonfarm Payrolls (Series ID: PAYEMS in
the St. Louis FRED database) less all employees in the construction sector (Series ID:
USCONS), times Average Weekly Hours of Production and Nonsupervisory Work-
ers (Series ID: ANHNONAG), divided by the CNP16OV. Source: BLS.
• Real Wages: Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Workers
(Series ID: CES2000000008), deflated by the implicit price deflator for the nonfarm
business sector. Source: BLS.
• Residential Mortgages: Home Mortgages (Table L.100, Federal Reserve Flow of
Funds), deflated by the implicit price deflator for the nonfarm business sector, di-
vided by the CNP16OV. Source: U.S. Federal Reserve Flow of Funds.
• Business debt: Credit market instruments of all nonfarm, nonfinancial corporate
(Table L.102) and noncorporate (Table L.103), deflated by the implicit price deflator
for the nonfarm business sector, divided by the CNP16OV. Source: U.S. Federal
Reserve Flow of Funds.
• Leverage: Total Financial Assets divided by Total Equity (Total Financial Assets
minus Total Liabilities) of Security Broker Dealers. Source: U.S. Federal Reserve
Flow of Funds.
• Inflation: Quarter on quarter log differences in the implicit price deflator for the
nonfarm business sector, demeaned. Source: St. Louis FRED.
• Nominal Short-term Interest Rate: 3-month Treasury Bill Rate (Secondary Market
Rate), expressed in quarterly units, demeaned. Source: St. Louis FRED.
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APPENDIX B
TABLES
Table B.1: Calibrated Parameters
Discount factors βp, βi, βe 0.9925, 0.97, 0.96
Housing utility parameters jp, ji 0.22, 1.87
Impatient household LTV mi 0.80
Share of capital in production α 0.325
Share of housing in production ν 0.035
Entrepreneur LTV me 0.55
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.03
Steady state markup X 1.15
Autocorrelation of inflation objective shock ρs 0.975
Leverage ratio of financial sector φ 21
Table B.2: Empirical Targets for Calibrated Parameters
Real interest rate 4r − 1 3%
Mortgage-Treasury spread 4 (rb − r) 1.7%
Investment share IY 17%
Household real estate wealth qhi+qhpY 1.7
Business sector real estate wealth qheY 1.3
Mortgage debt-to-output biY 0.64
Broker-dealer leverage φ 21
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Table B.3: Estimated Parameters
Prior Prior mean Prior s.d. Post. mean Post. s.d. 10% 90%
χi Γ 0.5 0.05 0.60 0.057 0.52 0.68
χp Γ 0.5 0.05 0.48 0.047 0.42 0.54
σ β 0.65 0.05 0.69 0.041 0.63 0.74
Ω Γ 2.1 0.275 1.06 0.135 0.89 1.25
φhp Γ 2.1 0.275 0.06 0.008 0.045 0.066
100γk N −0.24 0.01 −0.25 0.009 −0.259 −0.2378
100γc N 0.45 0.01 0.44 0.008 0.428 0.451
100γh N 0.38 0.01 0.41 0.01 0.392 0.418
i β 0.8 0.075 0.77 0.026 0.74 0.81
p β 0.8 0.075 0.48 0.055 0.41 0.55
e β 0.5 0.075 0.41 0.071 0.32 0.49
ρy N 0 0.1 0.27 0.058 0.19 0.35
ρr β 0.75 0.1 0.72 0.033 0.68 0.76
ρpi N 1.5 0.1 1.82 0.082 1.71 1.93
ζ β 0.65 0.03 0.86 0.01 0.85 0.88
ι, β 0.50 0.2 0.96 0.021 0.92 0.98
ρ j β 0.8 0.1 0.9934 0.0378 0.987 0.998
ρλ β 0.8 0.1 0.9197 0.0138 0.90 0.94
ρe β 0.8 0.1 0.9867 0.0071 0.97 0.99
ρτ β 0.8 0.1 0.1627 0.0378 0.11 0.22
ρz β 0.8 0.1 0.9007 0.019 0.87 0.93
ρc β 0.8 0.1 0.9938 0.0025 0.988 0.998
ρk β 0.8 0.1 0.9821 0.0190 0.97 0.99
10uλ inv-Γ 0.1 1 0.9030 0.0979 0.78 1.04
10uτ inv-Γ 0.1 1 1.3962 0.1006 1.27 1.53
10ue inv-Γ 0.1 1 0.0773 0.0089 0.06 0.89
10uc inv-Γ 0.1 1 0.0884 0.0117 0.07 0.11
10uk inv-Γ 0.1 1 0.1369 0.0142 0.12 0.16
10uz inv-Γ 0.1 1 0.2925 0.0382 0.24 0.35
10u j inv-Γ 0.1 1 0.4877 0.0569 0.38 0.63
10ur inv-Γ 0.1 1 0.0158 0.0014 0.014 0.018
100upi inv-Γ 0.1 1 0.2913 0.0369 0.24 0.35
1000us inv-Γ 0.1 1 0.4886 0.1065 0.35 0.64
ME(w) inv-Γ 0.1 1 0.1354 0.0098 0.12 0.15
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Table B.4: Business Cycle Properties of the Model (HP-Filter, λ = 1600)
Correlations 2.5% 5% Median Data 95% 97.5%
Output, Consumption 0.64 0.68 0.87 0.94 0.94 0.95
Output, Investment 0.82 0.84 0.93 0.91 0.97 0.98
Output, House price 0.47 0.51 0.71 0.42 0.83 0.84
Output, Total credit 0.64 0.68 0.83 0.64 0.91 0.92
Output, Leverage −0.56 −0.53 −0.25 0.02 0.10 0.30
House price, Leverage −0.33 −0.29 −0.01 −0.21 0.28 0.30
House price, Mortgage credit 0.56 0.59 0.76 0.70 0.87 0.88
House price, Consumption 0.14 0.20 0.57 0.46 0.79 0.80
House price, Inflation −0.14 −0.09 0.22 0.38 0.48 0.50
Mortgage credit, Consumption 0.10 0.16 0.55 0.39 0.78 0.79
Mortgage credit, Leverage −0.67 −0.64 −0.44 −0.22 −0.16 −0.14
Table B.5: Importance of rigidities
No No ζ = .1 No adj. Full Full Base
habit index sticky adj.
Marginal likelihood
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Figure C.1: Bank vs. Market-based Intermediation
Figure credit: Adrian and Shin (2010c)
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Figure C.2: Assets across business and financial entities
Figure credit: Adrian and Shin (2010c)
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Figure C.3: The size of broker-dealer funding markets
Figure credit: Adrian and Shin (2010c)
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Figure C.4: The composition of mortgage finance
Green line: Mortgage debt outstanding as a percentage of GDP.
Red line: Percentage of mortgages outstanding held by commercial banks, savings and
loans, and credit unions.
Blue line: Percentage of mortgages outstanding held by GSEs, Finance Companies, ABS
Issuers, and Real Estate Investment Trusts.
All data taken from the Flow of Funds.
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Figure C.5: The data
All data are log-transformed. Consumption, investment, lending and house prices are all
normalized to zero in 1985.1. Hours, the nominal interest rate and leverage are demeaned.
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Figure C.6: Data with estimated trends
Blue line: Median estimated trend
Dashed lines: 95% probability intervals.
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Figure C.8: Decomposing the financial funding shock
Blue: baseline model
Black: flexible prices
Green: no housing adjustment cost
Red: no collateral effects
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Figure C.13: Explaining the weak consumption response across financial,
housing, credit shocks
Blue line: financial funding shock
Black line: housing demand shock
Green line: entrepreneur credit shock
Red line: TFP shock
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Figure C.14: Comparison of ex-post model data with Federal Reserve Se-
nior Loan Officer Survey Data
First panel:
Green line: qualitative indicator of ex-post lending-deposit spread. 100 = spread above
steady state, -100 = spread below steady state.
Blue line: Net percentage of bankers increasing lending rates to firms over their own cost
of funds, Senior Loan Officer Survey, Federal Reserve Board.
Second panel:
Green line: Negative of the estimated entrepreneur credit shock.
Blue line: Percentage of bankers tightening lending standards for loans to firms, net the
percentage of bankers tightening lending standards for mortgages, Senior Loan Officer
Survey, Federal Reserve Board.
Third and Fourth panel:
Green line: Estimated financial funding shock.
Blue line: Change in credit default swap prices for the primary dealers.
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Figure C.15: Estimated exogenous processes.
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Figure C.16: Historical decomposition of the smoothed shocks, 1
Black: data
Green: without housing demand shocks
Blue: without Ent. credit shocks
Red: without Financial sector funding shocks
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Figure C.17: Historical decomposition of the smoothed shocks, 2
Black line: data
Green: without TFP shocks
Blue: without Cost-push shocks
Red: without IST shocks
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Figure C.18: Historical decomposition of the smoothed shocks, 3
Black: data
Green: without Labor preference shocks
Blue: without Monetary shocks (i.i.d. + inflation targeting)
Red: without Discount factor shocks
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APPENDIX D
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
D.1 Model equations, derivations, and balanced growth
D.1.1 Derivation of borrowing constraints
The borrowing constrained faced by entrepreneurs and households can be derived as an
optimal contract between borrowers and lenders given the following four assumptions:
1. Borrowers cannot commit to repay their debt.
2. The decision to default on a loan taken out in period t is made at the beginning of
period t + 1, before the realization of aggregate shocks.
3. In the event of default, ownership of the assets which were financed by the loan are
transferred to the lender at the end of the period, after the realization of aggregate
shocks.
4. Lenders can only recover the fraction (1 − mt)qt+1ht of the asset value upon liquida-
tion, with the remainder kept by the borrower.
A common problem faced by lenders who are forced to repossess physical assets is the
time lag between the default decision made by the borrower and actual ownership change
of the asset. During this time, borrowers typically retain access to the asset and hence
capture a portion of the value of that asset at the expense of the lender. Economic shocks
can alter the ultimate value of the asset between the default decision and repossession.
Assumptions 2− 4 capture the uncertainty over the liquidation value of the asset induced
by a delay in repossession.
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Under these assumptions it follows that a borrower will default if and only if
(1 − mt) Etqt+1(1 + pit+1)ht ≥ Etqt+1(1 + pit+1)ht − 1 + rb,t1 + pit bt
which reduces to (1 + rb,t)bt ≥ mtEtqt+1(1 + pit+1)ht.
A necessary condition for bankers to lend is that the loan bt satisfies the enforcement
constraint (1+ rb,t)bt ≤ mtEtqt+1(1+pit+1)ht. For an alternative environment which also leads
to a standard collateral constraint as an optimal contract between lender and borrower,
see Lorenzoni and Walentin (2008).
D.1.2 Financial sector derivations
I first establish the expression for V jt. Let λe,t = λi,t = λt, yielding Re,t = Ri,t = Rb,t (to be
proven later), then the banker’s objective can be stated as
V jt = max Et
∞∑
k=0
(1 − θ)θkβk+1p Γt,t+1+kN jt+1+k
= max Et
∞∑
k=0
(1 − θ)θkβk+1p Γt,t+1+k
[(
Rb,t+k − Rt+k) B jt+k + Rt+kN jt+k] = A1t + A2t
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where
A1t = B jt[(1 − θ)βpEtΓt,t+1(Rb,t − Rt)
+ θβpEtΓt,t+1
∞∑
k=0
(1 − θ)θkβk+1p Γt+1,t+2+k
(
Rb,t+1+k − Rt+1+k) B jt+1+kB jt ]
= B jt[(1 − θ)βpEtΓt,t+1(Rb,t − Rt)
+ θβpEtΓt,t+1
B jt+1
B jt
∞∑
k=0
(1 − θ)θkβk+1p Γt+1,t+2+k
(
Rb,t+1+k − Rt+1+k) B jt+1+kB jt+1 ]
= B jtϑt
A2t = (1 − θ)βpEtΓt,t+1RtN j,t + θβpEtΓt,t+1
∞∑
k=0
(1 − θ)kβk+1p Γt+1,t+2+kRt+1+kN j,t+1+k
= N jt[(1 − θ)βpEtΓt,t+1Rt
+ θβpEtΓt,t+1
N j,t+1
N jt
∞∑
k=0
(1 − θ)kβk+1p Γt+1,t+2+kRt+1+k
N j,t+1+k
N j,t+1
]
= N jtηt
Combining these results yields V jt = B jtϑt + N jtηt.
Next I derive the result that λi,t = λe,t implies Ri,t = Re,t. Suppose λet , λit. Using the
same derivation as above, V jt can be expressed as
V jt = ϑi,tB jit + ϑe,tB jet + ηtN jt
where
ϑs,t = Et
[
(1 − θ)βpΓt,t+1 (Rs,t − Rt) + βpΓt,t+1θxst,t+1ϑs,t+1]
ηt = Et
[
(1 − θ) + βpΓt,t+1θzt,t+1ηt+1
]
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xst,t+i ≡
B jst+1
B jst
zt,t+i ≡ N jt+iN jt
for s = i, e. When the incentive constraint binds, it can be expressed as
ηtN jt =
(
λi,t − ϑi,t) B jit + (λe,t − ϑe,t) B jet
or
N jt = φe,tB jet + φi,tB jit
where φz,t =
λz,t−ϑz,t
ηt
for z = i, e.
Bankers take lending and deposit rates as given when determining their portfolio of
loans. In equilibrium, it must be the case that the banker cannot increase his expected
terminal net worth by reallocating his portfolio of loans.
Suppose that the banker is given the opportunity to reallocate his portfolio of loans at
date t subject to the constraint his incentive compatibility constraint must not be violated.
In this case, the problem faced by the banker is
max
e,t ,i,t
V jt = Et
((
B jet + 
j
e,t
) (
Re,t − Rt) + (B jit +  ji,t) (Ri,t − Rt)) ξt+1 + EtZ jt
s.t. V jt ≥ λe,t
(
B jet + 
j
e,t
)
+ λi,t
(
B jit + 
j
i,t
)
where ξt+1 = (1− θ)βpΓt,t+1 + θβpΓt,t+1Rt+1ξt+2 is the expected discounted value of a marginal
gain of net worth at date t + 1 and Z jt collects all other components of V jt which are inde-
pendent of (i.e., additively separable in) B jet and B jit. The optimality conditions for this
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problem are
Etξt+1
(
Ri,t − Rt) = µt1 + µtλi,t
Etξt+1
(
Re,t − Rt) = µt1 + µtλe,t
where µt is the multiplier on the incentive constraint. If the incentive constraint does not
bind, so µt = 0, then Ri,t = Re,t. Similarly, if there is no moral hazard problem in making
loans, so λs,t = 0, then Re,t = Ri,t.
In general equilibrium, since bankers take rates as given, if at date t a positive spread
between lending and borrowing costs exists, then the incentive constraint must bind, else
bankers would demand an infinite number of deposits. When the incentive constraint
binds, dividing the two optimality conditions yields a relationship between commercial
and residential loans:
Ri,t − Rt
Re,t − Rt =
λi,t
λe,t
In the case that λe,t = λi,t = λt, then Ri,t = Re,t ≡ Rb,t.
Finally, note that if ϑt > λt, then the incentive constraint cannot bind by inspection
of (3.15). This is because if ϑt > λt then the marginal returns to lending are so high that
it is not worth it to forego participating in the financial sector rather then stealing from
depositors. In all subsequent analysis it is verified that ϑt < λt.
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D.1.3 Full equilibrium conditions, balanced growth, and steady state
equations
Equilibrium conditions
1. Impatient Households
λi,t = zt
(
Γi
ci,t−ici,t−1 −
EtiβiGcΓi
ci,t+1−ici,t
)
qtλi,t =
jt jizt
hi,t
+
µi,tmiEtqt+1(1+pit+1)
1+rb,t
+ βiGcEtλi,t+1qt+1
ztτtn
1+χi
i,t = λi,t(1 − σ)(1 − α − ν) YtXt
λi,t = µi,t + βiGcEtλi,t+1
1+rb,t
1+pit+1
qthi,t + ci,t +
1+rb,t−1
1+pit
bi,t−1 = (1 − σ)(1 − α − ν) YtXt + qthi,t−1 + bi,t
bi,t(1 + rb,t) = miEtqt+1(1 + pit+1)hi,t
2. Patient Households
λp,t = zt
(
Γp
cp,t−pcp,t−1 −
EtpβpGcΓp
cp,t+1−pcp,t
)
qtλp,t =
zt jt jp
hp,t
+ βpGcEtλp,t+1qt+1 − zt qhpcp
φhp
Gh
(
hp,t
G−1h hp
−Gh
)
ztτtn
1+χp
p,t = λp,tσ(1 − α − ν) YtXt
λp,t = βpGcEtλp,t+1 1+rt1+pit+1
φp =
qhx
cx
Gh
2
3. Entrepreneurs
λe,t =
Γe
ce,t−ece,t−1 −
βeGceΓeEt
ce,t+1−ece,t
qtλe,t =
µe,tme,tEtqt+1(1+pit+1)
1+rb,t
+ βeGcEtλe,t+1
(
νYt+1
Xt+1he,t
+ qt+1
)
λk,t = λe,tpk,t
λk,t =
µe,tme,t(1−δ)Et pk,t+1(1+pit+1)
1+rb,t
+ βeGcEtλe,t+1
(
αYt+1
Xt+1Kt
+ (1 − δ)pk,t+1
)
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λe,t
Ak,t
= λk,t
(
1 − Ω2
(
It
It−1 −GI
)2 −Ω ( ItIt−1 −GI) ItIt−1 ) + βeGcΩEtλk,t+1 ( It+1It −GI) I2t+1I2t
λe,t = µe,t + βeGcEtλe,t+1
1+rb,t
1+pit+1
ce,t + qthe,t + ItAk,t +
1+rb,t−1
1+pit
be,t−1 = be,t + qthe,t−1 + (α + ν) YtXt
be,t(1 + rb,t) = me,t
(
Etqt+1(1 + pit+1)he,t + (1 − δ)Etpk,t+1(1 + pit+1)Kt)
Kt = (1 − δ)Kt−1 +
(
1 − Ω2
(
It
It−1 −GI
)2)
It
Yt = Ac,t
(
nσp,tn
1−σ
i,t
)1−α−ν
kαt−1h
ν
e,t−1
4. Retailers, Monetary Policy and Market Clearing Conditions
ln (pit) − ι ln (pit−1) = βpGc (Et ln (pit+1) − ι ln (pit)) − pi ln
(
Xt
X
)
+ upi,t
1 + rt = (1 + rt−1)ρr
(
(1 + pit)ρpi
(
Yt
GcYt−1
)rY
(1 + r)
)1−ρR ur,t
st
ci,t + cp,t + ce,t + ItAk,t = Yt
hi,t + he,t + hp,t = Ht
5. Financial Sector
Γt−1,t =
Gcλp,t
λp,t−1
ϑt = Et
(
(1 − θ)βpGcΓt,t+1 (Rb,t − Rt) + βpGcθΓt,t+1xt,t+1ϑt+1)
ηt = 1 − θ + βpGcθEtΓt,t+1zt,t+1ηt+1
xt−1,t =
φt
φt−1 zt−1,t
zt,t+1 =
(
Rb,t − Rt) φt + Rt
φt =
ηt
λt−ϑt
bi,t + be,t = φtNt
bi,t + be,t = dt + Nt
Nt+1 = θzt,t+1Nt + ω
(
bi,t+be,t
1+pit+1
)
6. Exogenous processes:
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ln (zt) = ρz ln (zt−1) + uz,t
ln (τt) = ρτ ln (τt−1) + uτ,t
ln ( jt) = ρ j ln ( jt−1) + u j,t
ln
(
me,t
)
= (1 − ρe) ln (me) + ρe ln (me,t−1) + ue,t
ln (λt) = (1 − ρλ) ln (λ) + ρλ ln (λt−1) + uλ,t
ln (st) = ρs ln (st−1) + us,t
ln
(
Ac,t
)
= t ln (1 + γc) + ln
(
vc,t
)
ln
(
vc,t
)
= ρc ln
(
vc,t−1
)
+ uc,t
ln
(
Ak,t
)
= t ln (1 + γk) + ln
(
vk,t
)
ln
(
vk,t
)
= ρk ln
(
vk,t−1
)
+ uk,t
ln (Ht) = t ln (1 + γh)
Balanced growth
The model in the above form is non stationary due to trend growth in total factor pro-
ductivity, investment-specific technological change and housing technology. We are in-
terested in deriving a stationary version of the model which features balanced growth. To
de-trend the model, the following procedure is applied:
1. Divide all variables by their deterministic growth rate. For any variable xt, define
Gx ≡ xtxt−1 . Then the transformation proceeds by letting x?t = xtGtx for all endogenous
variables in the model. For the technology processes, make the following transfor-
mations:
Ac,t = Ac,t
(1 + γc)t
(1 + γc)t
= vc,t(1 + γc)t
Ak,t = Ak,t
(1 + γk)t
(1 + γk)t
= vk,t(1 + γk)t
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Ht = Ht
(1 + γh)t
(1 + γh)t
= (1 + γh)t
2. Impose a balanced-growth steady state to the transformed equilibrium conditions.
Doing so imposes restrictions among growth rates. The results of this process are:
• Hours, lending/deposit rates, φt, ϑt, ηt, xt−1,t, zt−1,t and inflation all are stationary
in the untransformed model.
• Remaining variables grow at the rate of aggregate consumption growth, which
is equal to
Gc = ((1 + γc)(1 + γk)α(1 + γh)ν)
1
1−α
except investment (capital), which is equal to
GI = (1 + γk)Gc
and house prices
Gq = (1 + γh)−1Gc
and the housing stock
Gh = 1 + γh
The resulting detrended model is given by the following equilibrium conditions:
1. Impatient Households
λ?i,t = zt
(
Γi
c?i,t−
i
Gc
c?i,t−1
− iβiΓiEtzt+1
c?i,t+1−
i
Gc
c?i,t
)
q?t λ
?
i,t =
jt jizt
h?i,t
+
µ?i,tmiGqEtq
?
t+1(1+pit+1)
1+rb,t
+ βiGqEtλ?i,t+1q
?
t+1
ztτtn
1+χ
i,t = λ
?
i,t
Y?t
Xt
λ?i,t = µ
?
i,t + βiEtλ
?
i,t+1
1+rb,t
1+pit
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q?t h
?
i,t + c
?
i,t +G
−1
c
1+rb,t−1
1+pit
b?i,t−1 = (1 − σ)(1 − α − ν)Y
?
t
Xt
+ q?t h
?
i,t−1G
−1
h + b
?
i,t
b?i,t(1 + rb,t) = miGqEtq
?
t+1(1 + pit+1)h
?
i,t
2. Patient Households
λ?p,t = zt
(
Γp
c?p,t− pGc c?p,t−1
− pβpΓpEt
c?p,t+1−
p
Gc
c?p,t
)
q?t λ
?
p,t =
zt jt jp
h?p,t
+ βpGqEtλ?p,t+1q
?
t+1 − zt qhpcp φhp
(hp,t
hp
− 1
)
ztτtn
1+χ
p,t = λ
?
p,tσ(1 − α − ν)Y
?
t
Xt
λ?p,t = βpEtλ
?
p,t+1
1+rt
1+pit+1
3. Entrepreneurs
λ?e,t =
Γe
c?e,t− eGc c?e,t−1
− βeeΓeEtc?e,t+1− eGc c?e,t
q?t λ
?
e,t =
µ?e,tme,tGqEtq
?
t+1(1+pit+1)
1+rb,t
+ βeGqEtλ?e,t+1
(
νGhY?t+1
Xt+1h?e,t
+ q?t+1
)
λ?k,t = λ
?
e,tp
?
k,t
(1 + γk)λ?k,t =
µ?e,tme,t(1−δ)Et p?k,t+1(1+pit+1)
1+rb,t
+ βeEtλ?e,t+1
(
αGkY?t+1
Xt+1Kt
+ (1 − δ)p?k,t+1
)
λ?e,t
vk,t
= λ?k,t
(
1 − Ω2
(
I?t
I?t−1
− 1
)2
G2I −Ω
(
I?t
I?t−1
− 1
)
I?t
I?t−1
G2I
)
+βe(1+γk)−1ΩEtλ?k,t+1
(
I?t+1
I?t
− 1
)
I2?t+1
I2?t
G3I
λ?e,t = µ
?
e,t + βeEtλ
?
e,t+1
1+rb,t
1pi t+1
c?e,t + q
?
t h
?
e,t +
I?t
vk,t
+G−1c
1+rb,t−1
1+pit
b?e,t−1 = b
?
e,t + q
?
t G
−1
h h
?
e,t−1 + (α + ν)
Y?t
Xt
b?e,t(1 + rb,t) = me,t
(
GqEtq?t+1(1 + pit+1)he,t + (1 + γk)
−1(1 − δ)Etp?k,t+1(1 + pit+1)K?t
)
K?t = G
−1
I (1 − δ)K?t−1 +
(
1 − Ω2
(
I?t
I?t−1
− 1
)2)
G2I I
?
t
Y?t = G
−α
I G
−ν
h vc,t
(
nσp,tn
1−σ
i,t
)1−α−ν
k?αt−1h
?ν
e,t−1
4. Retailers, Monetary Policy and Market Clearing Conditions
ln (pit) − ι ln (pit−1) = βpGc (Et ln (pit+1) − ι ln (pit)) − pi ln
(
Xt
X
)
+ upi,t
1 + rt = (1 + rt−1)ρr
(
(1 + pit)ρpi
(
Yt
GcYt−1
)rY
(1 + r)
)1−ρR ur,t
st
c?i,t + c
?
p,t + c
?
e,t +
I?t
vk,t
= Y?t
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h?i,t + h
?
e,t + h
?
p,t = 1
5. Financial Sector
Γ?t−1,t =
λ?p,t
λ?p,t−1
ϑt = Et
(
(1 − θ)βpΓ?t,t+1
(
Rb,t − Rt) + βpθΓ?t,t+1xt,t+1ϑt+1)
ηt = 1 − θ + βpθEtΓ?t,t+1zt,t+1ηt+1
xt−1,t =
φt
φt−1 zt−1,t
zt,t+1 =
(
Rb,t − Rt) φt + Rt
φt =
ηt
λt−ϑt
b?i,t + b
?
e,t = φtN
?
t
b?i,t + b
?
e,t = d
?
t + N
?
t
N?t+1 = G
−1
c θzt,t+1N
?
t +G
−1
c ω
(
bi,t+be,t
1+pit+1
)
Deterministic Steady State
The model is log-linearized around a deterministic steady state. The following derivation
characterizes the steady state system and lays the groundwork for the calibration. Begin
with
qhe
Y
=
νβeGcX−1
1 − meGq
(
R−1b − βe
)
− βeGq
≡ φ0
K
Y
=
αβeGkX−1
1 + γk − me(1 − δ)
(
R−1b − βe
)
− βe(1 − δ)
≡ φ1
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qhi
ci
=
ji
1 − miGq
(
R−1b − βi
)
− βiGq
≡ φ2
ci
Y
=
(1 − σ)(1 − α − ν)X−1
1 + φ2
(
1 −G−1h − miGq
(
R−1b −G−1c
)) ≡ φ3
qhp
cp
=
jp
1 −Gqβp ≡ φ4
ce
Y
=
((
R−1b −G−1c
)
meGq +G−1h − 1
)
φ0+
((
R−1b −G−1c
)
me(1 − δ)(1 + γk)−1 − 1 + (1 − δ)G−1k
)
φ1
+ X−1 (α + ν) ≡ φ5
cp
Y
= 1 − φ3 − φ5 − φ1
(
1 −G−1k (1 − δ)
)
≡ φ6
q
Y
= φ0 + φ2φ3 + φ4φ6 ≡ φ7
Combining the market clearing conditions for labor yields
np =
(
σ(1 − α − ν) Y
cpX
) 1
1+χp
ni =
(
(1 − σ)(1 − α − ν) Y
ciX
) 1
1+χi
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Define Ne ≡ nσ(1−α−ν)p n(1−σ)(1−α−ν)i . Then combining terms above with the production
function yields
Y =
(
φα1
(
φ0
φ7
)ν
NeG−νh G
−α
k
) 1
1−α
which enables the recovery of all previously defined values in levels.
From the patient household’s Euler equation, r = 1
βp
− 1. For the financial sector we
have
x = z = (rb − r) φ + 1 + r
φ =
η
λ − ϑ
ϑ =
(1 − θ)βp (rb − r)
1 − βpθz
η =
1 − θ
1 − βpθz
N =
bi + be
φ
ω =
N(Gc − θz)
bi + be
∈ (0, 1)
D = bi + be − N
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λ = ϑ +
η
φ
∈ (0, 1)
Given βp and a value for leverage and the spread, θ determines λ. Provided that the
steady state lending spread is positive and that the expected return to net worth satisfies
βpθz < 1, then the participation constraint binds along the steady state balanced growth
path. Moreover, a sufficient condition for the borrowing constraint of both entrepreneurs
and impatient households to bind in steady state is µx = c−1x (1 − βx(1 + rb)) > 0 for x = i, e.
D.2 Estimation Details
D.2.1 Measurement equations
Let starred variables denote the detrended variables, that is the variables scaled by their
deterministic trend. Therefore: c?t =
Ct
GtC
, I?t =
It
GtI
,w?t =
wt
Gtw
, b?e,t =
be,t
Gte
, b?i,t =
bi,t
Gti
, q?t =
qt
Gtq
. Let a
superscript d denote the data. The measurement equations are given by
ln
(
Cdt
)
− ln
(
Cd1975.1
)
= Cˆ?t +
1
1−α (ωc + αωk + νωh) t
ln
(
Idt
)
− ln
(
Id1975.1
)
= Iˆ?t +
1
1−α (ωc + ωk + νωh) t
ln
(
wdt
)
− ln
(
wd1975.1
)
= wiwi+wp wˆ
?
i,t +
wp
wi+wp
wˆ?p,t
1
1−α (ωc + αωk + νωh) t + uw,t
ln
(
bdi,t
)
− ln
(
bdi,1975.1
)
= bˆ?i,t +
1
1−α (ωc + αωk + νωh) t
ln
(
bde,t
)
− ln
(
bde,1975.1
)
= ˆb?e,t +
1
1−α (ωc + αωk + νωh) t
ln
(
qdt
)
− ln
(
qd1975.1
)
= qˆ?t +
1
1−α (ωc + αωk − (1 − α − ν)ωh) t
ln
(
Ndt
)
= nini+np nˆi,t +
np
ni+np
nˆp,t
ln
(
φdt
)
= φˆt
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pidt = pˆit
rdt = rˆt
where the transformation γx ≡ exp(ωx) − 1 has been applied, x = c, k, q, ωx ∈ R.
D.2.2 Estimation technique, results, and diagnostics
Bayesian methods are used to estimate the model parameters. In a Bayesian approach,
the data Y as well as the parameters Θ are random variables. Given the joint distribution
function P(Θ,Y), application of Bayes theorem yields
P(Θ|Y) ∝ P(Y |Θ) × P(Θ)
The likelihood function P(Y |Θ), derived from the state-space representation of the lin-
earized model, is applied to update the prior P(Θ) and form the posterior distribution
P(Θ|Y). Since the posterior distribution of the parameters does not belong to any known
family of distributions, the Metropolis Hastings algorithm is used to approximate the
posterior.1 In all 2 Markov Chains are computed, with each chain consisting of 350, 000
draws with a burn-in of 87, 500 draws. The constant of proportionality is set to 0.36,
which generates an acceptance rate of around 29%. Convergence is assessed according
the Brooks-Gelman diagnostics. Figure D.1 reports the aggregate diagnostic, the red and
blue lines corresponding to the within and between-chain results, respectively. Figure D.2
contains the posterior distributions.
The sensitivity of the model parameters to the real and nominal rigidities in the model
is documented in Table D.1. Each column presents the mode of the model parameters
1See Sungbae and Schorfheide (2007) for a detailed description of Bayesian estimation of DSGE models,
and Smets and Wouters (2007) for a benchmark application to a New Keynesian model.
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and marginal likelihood when removing/dramatically reducing one friction.2
The most important rigidity in the model (in terms of the marginal likelihood) is that
of prices - reducing the Calvo probability to ζ = 0.1 decreases the marginal likelihood
by a staggering 43%. To compensate for the lack of price rigidity, patient household con-
sumption habits rise to 0.99, investment adjustment costs increase significantly, and the
smoothing component of the policy rule rises to 0.95. The volatility of nearly all the shocks
rises and their persistence falls. On the contrary, allowing for sticky wages has virtually
no effect on the likelihood (a loss of 1%).
Moving on to the effects of real rigidities, investment adjustment costs are by far the
most costly to eliminate - the marginal likelihood falls by 8% when removing it. The in-
terest rate response to output and consumption habits for impatient households increase,
while consumption habits for entrepreneurs decrease, all in an attempt to reduce the ad-
ditional volatility created by the lack of investment smoothing. Just as important is the
absence of housing adjustment costs for impatient households: allowing for these causes
the marginal likelihood to deteriorate by 8%. The smoothing effects of additional housing
adjustment costs reduces the strength of investment adjustment costs and the interest rate
response to output. Additionally, the persistence of the housing demand shock falls and
its volatility rises.
Of less importance, eliminating consumption habits or inflation indexation results in
a small deterioration of the marginal likelihood of around 4%. The absence of consump-
tion habits increases the persistence of discount factor shock, dampens the impact of im-
patient households by decreasing their labor share, strengthens investment adjustment
costs, increases the interest rate response to output, and increases interest rate smoothing
in the policy rule. All of these changes attempt to compensate for the loss of consumption
2The marginal likelihood is based on the Laplace approximation. See DeJong and Dave (2007) for a
formal introduction and comparison of alternative methods to compute the marginal likelihood of a DSGE
model.
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smoothing preferences given by habit persistence. Similarly, the increased volatility in
real wages resulting from a lack of indexation dampens the presence of impatient house-
holds through a smaller value of σ as well as increasing interest rate smoothing.
Overall, the results from this sensitivity exercise illustrate that most of the estimated
parameters appear relatively robust to changes in the frictions one by one. Eliminating
frictions changes a small subset of parameters in ways that compensate for the loss of the
friction. The presence of sticky prices is by far the most important friction in terms of the
overall empirical performance of the model. In a distant second, but still of importance,
are investment adjustment costs and the lack of housing adjustment costs for impatient
households.
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Table D.1: Importance of rigidities
No No ζ = .1 No adj. Full Full Base
habit index sticky adj.
Marginal likelihood
2075 2060 1232 1993 2145 2005 2164
Mode
χi 0.52 0.56 0.52 0.57 0.58 0.52 0.51
χp 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.45 0.47
σ 0.89 0.82 0.77 0.72 0.80 0.85 0.67
Ω 1.77 1.40 1.69 0 1.21 1.17 1.03
φhp 0.03 0.04 0.26 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.05
φhi 0 0 0 0 0 0.41 0
100γk −0.23 −0.24 −0.22 −0.23 −0.25 −0.24 −0.24
100γc 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.44
100γh 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.38 0.40 0.43 0.40
i 0 0.67 0.62 0.87 0.86 0.61 0.76
p 0 0.53 0.99 0.45 0.64 0.57 0.46
e 0 0.28 0.35 0.25 0.32 0.30 0.41
ρy 0.38 0.27 0.03 0 0.16 0.14 0.28
ρr 0.82 0.80 0.95 0.52 0.72 0.75 0.72
ρpi 1.72 1.87 1.73 2.12 1.83 1.69 1.82
ζ 0.88 0.88 0.10 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.86
ζw 0 0 0 0 0.57 0 0
ι, 0.96 0 0.94 0.79 0.97 0.95 0.97
ιw, 0 0 0 0 0.62 0 0
ρ j 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.99
ρλ 0.90 0.91 0.84 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.91
ρe 0.98 0.99 0.89 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.99
ρτ 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.36 0.05 0.10 0.15
ρz 0.99 0.86 0.75 0.86 0.85 0.91 0.90
ρc 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
ρk 0.91 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98
10uλ 0.76 0.86 1.24 0.77 0.85 0.95 0.87
10uτ 1.67 1.37 4.86 1.40 8.60 1.23 1.37
10ue 0.05 0.08 0.29 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.07
10uc 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.08
10uk 0.15 0.16 4.28 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.13
10uz 0.59 0.24 7.30 0.25 0.35 0.23 0.27
10u j 0.76 0.73 3.70 1.10 0.58 2.21 0.40
10ur 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
100upi 0.22 0.35 0.04 1.13 0.03 0.25 0.27
1000us 0.22 0.24 0.11 0.38 0.34 0.16 0.48
ME(w) 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13
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Figure D.1: Brooks-Gelman aggregate diagnostic
Red line - within chain, Blue line - between chain diagnostic
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D.2.3 Additional Impulse Responses
The remaining impulse responses are contained in Figures D.3-D.7.
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Figure D.8: Median variance decompositions across high/low leverage
regimes
Low lev = Steady state leverage φ = 15, High lev = Steady state leverage φ = 25
Low LTV = Steady state mortgage LTV mi = .80, High LTV = Steady state mortgage LTV
mi = .95
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